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1 Introduction 
The pricing of urban roads is perhaps the greatest instance in the sphere of transport policy of 
practice not keeping pace with theory (Calthrop and Proost, 1998). Road pricing has been 
developed as an economic concept for many decades, with Arthur Pigou (1920), Adam Smith 
(1937) and William Vickrey (1963) each presenting compelling landmark arguments for the 
practice some fifty or more years ago (Lindsey, 2006). More recently - since the 1970’s - the 
academic interest in road pricing has steadily accelerated (Lindsey, 2006), with support and 
criticisms coming from a wider set of fields as it is recognised as a means of managing 
demand for limited capacity, the road asset, environmental externalities, safety issues, freight 
and many other road or traffic problems.  
 
Road pricing has increasingly been included in government commissioned independent 
reports for transport, ranging from the landmark Smeed Report (1964) which specifically 
focussed on pricing approaches for road transport, to the Parry report into sustainable 
transport in NSW (2003), to the Henry (2009) review into Australian taxation, to name but a 
few. These reports have gone some way to bridging the gap between economic abstraction 
and real-world feasibility, and have generally recommended road pricing of some type; in 
doing so demonstrating a belief that, political considerations aside, road pricing is a realistic 
possibility.  
 
Despite the wealth of academic and theoretical knowledge of road pricing, a significant 
majority of which argues for it (Lindsey, 2006), only a relative few metropolitan areas around 
the world have implemented road pricing schemes. Fewer still have implemented it with some 
degree of sophistication, such as the ability to differentiate price according to time of day, 
vehicle-specific emissions, safety features or some other criteria, and fewer again have 
implemented it successfully or in a politically sustainable manner. While technological 
impediments would have been a legitimate excuse for an implementation lag in Pigou’s, or 
even Vickrey’s, time, “as the cost of tolling equipment falls, the set of realistic policy options 
to internalise these externalities will continue to grow” (Calthrop and Proost, 1998, pg 335). 
 
Road pricing, thought of as a policy rather than an economic abstraction, “allows great 
flexibility in pursuing a variety of public policy objectives” (Forkenbrock, 2005, pg. 98), and 
is unlikely to be any more expensive to implement than (comparably effective) alternative 
policy options, especially in regards to congestion and capacity building. Road pricing 
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schemes have been shown to be able to repay their own implementation costs in very 
reasonable timeframes (de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen, 2006). Despite these positives, road 
pricing schemes have not, in general, been readily adopted. Clearly there is something about 
road pricing that is not to the tastes of many decision-makers or policy-makers (Schade and 
Schlag, 2003). 
 
This paper is presented in six broad sections. This introduction will justify the research, 
provide a scope, and give rationale for the approach taken. The second section gives a 
theoretical overview of the logic of road pricing from a variety of perspectives, and explores 
the experience of international jurisdictions in implementing road pricing schemes. The third 
section addresses acceptability, both public and political, as it relates to road pricing, as well 
as any specific elements that may be particularly pertinent to a Sydney context. Section four 
details the ‘results’ of the interview process undertaken for this research, including recurrent 
themes from the interviews, as well as any specific points that were of particular insight. 
Section five compares these results to the conventional wisdom: the ways in which the 
Sydney experience has or may be expected to concur or diverge from that posited in the 
literature. Section six concludes the paper by summarising the findings and implications of 
the research, providing limitations of the present study and outlining areas for further 
research. 
 
1.1 Purpose 
Christainsen, in assessing the institutional environment that facilitated Singapore’s road 
pricing scheme, noted that “Singapore essentially broke the mold [sic] ... and the precise 
political conditions under which such breakthroughs occur, and endure, deserve more research 
on the part of political scientists as well as economists” and then pondered “whether those 
conditions are now close to being met in additional cities around the world” (Christainsen, 
2006, pg. 87). This paper seeks to explore those aspects of road pricing that have inhibited its 
implementation, or even adoption within a broader transport policy, by more jurisdictions, 
and whether the conditions that Christainsen noted are present or even feasible in Sydney.  
 
A reasonable assumption or hypothesis is that “political will” (or a synonymous phrase) 
would feature prominently in this exploration. Therefore the task at hand is to disaggregate 
“political will” into its component parts, to fully understand why it is that more decision-
makers have not adopted, and continue to avoid, road pricing as part of a suite of transport 
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policies. This paper will examine these factors with particular reference to Sydney, Australia, 
including a consideration of institutional environments, decision making, and existing 
transport policy. 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide some insights, by which any future proposed road 
pricing scheme for Sydney (or, more broadly, New South Wales) could be assessed not only 
for its theoretical merits or benefit-cost ratio, but also for the very feasibility of its 
implementation in the first place. This research, being exploratory in nature, will “investigate 
an issue or topic in order to develop insight and ideas about its underlying nature” and 
acknowledging that the “issue may require further research study for problem resolution” 
(McNabb, 2009, pg. 96). By examining the ‘sticking points’ of implementing road pricing 
policy in global examples and in NSW, it is intended that a set of issues can be identified 
whose consideration will enhance the political feasibility of this economically sound but 
politically dangerous policy concept.  
 
1.2 Scope 
The scope of this paper can be expressed as one key assumption and two qualifications of the 
approach taken. 
 
It is assumed that in any urban area where road pricing could be applied, there is some 
“optimal” model of road pricing for that context. Variables in the model may include pricing 
structures, technology, pricing levels (both absolute and relative) and geographic reach 
(Balwani and Singh, 2009). Variables in the context may include levels or layers of 
government, physical topography, population and population density, and even elements of 
culture (Albalate and Bel, 2008; Schade and Schlag, 2003). This research will assume that for 
every feasible context above some threshold of population, density, and/or urbanisation, 
including Sydney, there is some ‘ideal’ or optimal model of road pricing. It also 
acknowledges that ‘ideal’ models could vary greatly between contexts and that in many (if not 
most) contexts, an implemented scheme will likely be sub-optimal for a variety of reasons. 
This generalised view of “road pricing” follows in a similar vein to Lindsey (2006, pp. 295-
296), who notes that “road pricing is defined broadly to include any form of direct user 
charges (e.g. tolls and area licenses), charges on urban and intercity roads, charges on any 
form of motorized transport, and charges for any purpose”, and that “various terms are used in 
the literature besides ‘road pricing’, including ‘tolls’, ‘road-use pricing’, ‘road-user charging’, 
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‘congestion charging’, ‘congestion pricing’ and ‘congestion metering’. I use ‘road pricing’ to 
encompass all these terms”.  
 
The first qualification of the present research is that the paper will not explore technological 
features, pricing models, and pricing levels of any given scheme beyond how they affect the 
acceptability of a given model. There is a great depth of existing literature on optimal pricing 
scenarios for various contexts, and this paper will not contribute to that discussion. As such, 
throughout the paper, unless specified otherwise, “road pricing” could be considered to mean 
“road pricing of some description” or even “road pricing of some optimal description”, rather 
than “road pricing of a particular description”. While perhaps not ideal itself, this is a 
necessary limitation in order to remain focussed on the primary question of acceptability. This 
limitation follows the precedents of Viegas (2001); Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann 
(2002); Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005); Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini (2001); 
Schade and Schlag (2003); and Albalate and Bel (2009) who each assess the political 
acceptability of road pricing, as a principle or concept (but not specific models) in a general 
sense (i.e. not specific to any city or location). 
 
Secondly, “freight transport plays an ever increasing role in the urban economy” (Hensher 
and Puckett, 2005, pg 573). Given the significance of transport costs to the freight sector, and 
the potential impact on those costs posed by road pricing, freight could well warrant being 
treated separately to private vehicle use in the analysis set out in this paper (Newbery, 1990; 
Hensher and Puckett, 2005). Presently, freight will not be treated separately in this analysis. 
This is a limitation of the analysis, however could tenuously be overcome by considering 
freight concessions (or some other freight-specific mechanism) within the understanding of 
“road pricing of some optimal description”, as noted above.  
 
1.3 The Grounds for Road Pricing in Sydney 
Sydney would, on face value, be an ideal candidate for urban road pricing; it is a sprawling 
metropolis with a large population, frequent congestion problems, notable air pollution and a 
large freight task1 (Council of Australian Governments, 2006). It also has an established 
                                            
1 What is considered urban sprawl, a large population, and problematic levels of air pollution and 
congestion is subjective and relative. Compared to Los Angeles or Beijing, for example, Sydney is 
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motorway network with electronic tolling, and therefore a driving population for whom the 
notion of tolling is not foreign, nor is the technology for toll collection. Road pricing has been 
mooted as a component of Sydney’s (NSW’s) broader transport policy for some years, largely 
within a discourse of congestion, yet little progress has been made in the implementation of a 
comprehensive road pricing scheme (Lay, 2010). 
 
Recurrent congestion (here opposed to incidental congestion associated with a particular 
planned or unplanned ‘event’) occurs where populations and densities are greatest. Intuitively, 
“the most densely developed cities tend to be the most congested” (Taylor, 2002, pg. 11), and 
congestion abatement techniques, including road pricing, are most likely to be effective, and 
therefore justify their expense, in those same areas. 
 
Sydney conforms to these characteristics. The greater metropolitan area of Sydney has 4.72 
million drivers license holders and 5.33 million private and commercial vehicles registered in 
2009 (Roads and Traffic Authority, 2009). Sydney has both the greatest population of all 
Australian cities, and the second highest projected growth rate of metropolitan private vehicle 
travel in the fifteen years to 2020 (Council of Australian Governments, 2006).  
 
In a study assessing the technical feasibility of implementing road pricing schemes in 
Australian capital cities, the former Australian Federal Department of Transport and Regional 
Services (DOTARS) noted that, against criteria of geography, population, density, and 
underlying congestion levels, “the largest Australian cities (Sydney and Melbourne) ... have 
sufficiently severe congestion problems to warrant these being addressed by charging 
policies”, and that “congestion in the larger Australian cities is at a level where road pricing 
merits detailed consideration”, and that “cities such as Stockholm, San Francisco, Manchester 
and Auckland, with populations similar to or smaller than most Australian capital cities, have 
taken this step” (Department of Transport and Regional Services, 2006, pg20 and pg. 52). 
  
1.4 Methodology 
This research has two distinct but connected components. One component is theoretical and 
literature based, and the other is empirical and qualitative. Throughout the course of the 
                                                                                                                                        
or has none of these characteristics. The point being made is that, in absolute terms, Sydney is 
assumed to be a suitable candidate for a road pricing scheme. 
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research, the two had a cyclical relationship: each prompted greater or more specific enquiry 
in the other. The theoretical and literature based component focussed broadly on the concepts 
reflected in the first two substantial sections of this paper; road pricing theory, and notions of 
political acceptability.  
 
The “combined approach” to research where quantitative and qualitative methodologies are 
used in parallel is appropriate for a research topic such as the one addressed here as it reflects 
a mainstream approach to problems of policy, where “public sector researchers use qualitative 
and quantitative research methods in generally equal proportions”, whereas “academic 
researchers still [generally] favour adopting quantitative approaches” (McNabb, 2008, pg. 
12). Indeed this apparent disjoint in approaches to knowledge creation, if true, may already go 
some way to explaining the same disjoint in what the academic world supports and what the 
public sector exercises, a prime example being road pricing policy. 
 
The research identified a number of existing quantitative studies into public and political 
acceptability of road pricing strategies in other contexts. Although a robust meta-analysis of 
such studies would be ideal, various limitations of the project had to concede to one major 
disadvantage of the meta-analytical process: “simply the amount of effort and [most 
pertinently for this project] expertise it takes” (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, pg. 7). Such studies 
do offer value to a discussion of the acceptability problem or road pricing in Sydney, and so 
rather than disregard them, a ‘content analysis’ approach was taken, “by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics” of sample studies (McNabb, 2009, pg.12). 
McNabb (2009, pg. 12) notes that it is “nearly impossible to avoid interjecting some 
researcher bias into this method of analysis”: an unfortunate but necessary limitation of the 
present research. 
 
The empirical component of the research took the form of nine semi-structured interviews 
with individuals from a variety of backgrounds or perspectives. Although the sample of 
interviewees was not large, they were approached such that views were collected from: 
• Government (state and federal levels of government) 
• Peak bodies 
• Private enterprise 
• Academia 
• Political spheres 
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Within the broad grouping of “Government”, individuals were consulted that could be further 
distinguished as road-pricing subject matter experts, policy development specialists, and 
policy strategists. The diversity of interviewees is important, as Laurel (2003, pg. 148) notes: 
“we often use expert interviews when studying a category, and we find that our most 
productive and enlightening experts are outside the category. Their perspectives and frame of 
reference are unique – exactly what we need to challenge more entrenched thinking”. 
For a more detailed account of the interviewees, please refer to Appendix 1. 
 
 
Schematically, the research followed the following process: 
 
Figure 1: Phased research methodology 
Adapted from McNabb (2009, pg. 11, 19-23) 
 
 
1.4.1 The Qualitative Approach 
A qualitative approach may be unconventional in the field of transport studies. Traditional 
research practices in the field include travel surveys, stated and revealed choice experiments 
and applied choice analysis (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 2005; Stopher and Stecher, 2006; 
Bliemer, Rose and Hensher, 2009), all of which have a far stronger quantitative approach and 
intuitively reflect the largely technical nature of the field of transport studies (or fields within 
transport studies).  
 
However transport research within the context of a transport policy process is far less black-
and-white. As Meyer and Miller (2001, pg. 41) state, “understanding the nature of alternative 
decision-making processes and the needs and capabilities of those who participate in them are 
thus prerequisites for the development of an effective transportation planning process”. This 
point is emphasised by Button and Hensher (2005, pg. 1), who posit that “transport policy 
2a. Lit review–
Road Pricing
2b. Lit review 
– Political 
acceptability
1. Problem 
definition and 
research 
design
3. Interviewee 
‘scouting’
4. Question 
set design
5. Conduct 
Interviews
6. Analysis and 
synthesis
7. Drafting 
and proofing
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formulation is far from institution-neutral”, “is something that varies with time and place” and 
“depends upon the underlying political and philosophical underpinnings of the society 
concerned” where “what scientists consider to be rational choices give way to beliefs, norms 
and prejudices that are inherent in the institutions of the country”.  
 
If these beliefs, norms and prejudices of institutions are so influential in transport policy, and 
if “the main obstacle to road pricing is political much more than operational” (Albalate and 
Bel, 2009, pg. 964) then research approaches that seek to capture these beliefs seems more 
compatible with the field of transport research and policy than initially apparent. A very 
similar approach has been taken for the case of Edinburgh road pricing policy failure by Rye, 
Gaunt and Ison (2008). 
 
1.4.2 Case Study Learning 
This research draws on case studies of road pricing strategies throughout the world, and in 
turn explores the conditions for that policy in a ‘new’ context, in doing so presenting a case 
study itself. Case study research is most appropriate when research topics are “defined 
broadly”, “cover contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated 
variables”, and “rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence” (Yin, 2003, pg. 1). 
The acceptability problem of road pricing strategies, and particularly in a Sydney context, is 
precisely that. As noted above, the research is exploratory in nature, and as such the 
experiences of other cities or governments in implementing a road pricing scheme is highly 
relevant. A similar comparative case study method has been adopted, in road pricing 
acceptability research by Albalate and Bel (2009) and de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen 
(2006), as well as numerous single-case case studies.  
 
While much case study literature focuses on the ‘success case method’, which focuses on 
documenting, presumably for the purposes of replicating, actions or decisions that have 
resulted in or contributed to a desirable outcome, this research will also examine cases of 
failure: where road pricing has been debated but decided against; trialled but not continued; or 
implemented and later dissolved. Mustafa (2008) gives a comprehensive account of the 
benefits and pitfalls of case study method, and the similarities and complementary nature it 
can have with more quantitative methods.  The present research may also act as a case study 
in the same body of literature.   
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2 Road Pricing 
In very general terms, the objectives of pricing of vehicles including passenger vehicles for 
their road use fall into two non-mutually exclusive categories: changing the travel behaviour 
of motorists, and a raising revenue or funding exercise (sometimes specifically for road or 
transport projects) (Albalate and Bel, 2009, Schweitzer and Taylor, 2008). While potentially 
an important consideration for governments, the latter is not at the fore of the economic 
purists mind. The fundamental premise is that “if road pricing is to be effective … some trips 
will be changed in mode, others in time, some others in space, and possibly some others 
cancelled altogether” (Viegas, 2001, pg. 290). 
 
This section will give an outline of the general principles of road pricing, some considerations 
of its place within a broader context of transport planning and public policy, and review case 
studies of attempted road pricing implementation from international examples. 
 
2.1 Efficient Markets 
Market efficiency is frequently cited as a prominent virtue of road pricing, or the pricing of 
transport more generally to reflect overt and covert costs. Goodwin (1995, pg. 149) quite 
bluntly surmises the collective expert opinion on road pricing: “charging people something 
for the external costs of congestion and environmental damage will be more efficient than not 
charging them”. Albalate and Bel (2009, pg 963) present an academic but simple premise: 
“traffic is efficiently allocated when the price paid by each road user equals the marginal cost 
faced by the rest of users”. 
 
The efficiency of pricing mechanisms is often exalted by the economic literature without 
addressing the “why” beyond it being a matter of economic principle (Schade and Schlag, 
2003). Parry (2002) provides great insight into the observable outcomes (in terms of 
congestion reduction) of efficiencies in transport pricing by comparing a variety of policy 
options within road pricing. From a political acceptability perspective, this is crucial, and 
often overlooked, as Parry (2002, pg. 354) determines that “a congestion tax imposed 
uniformly across freeway lanes can generally achieve more than 90% of the maximum 
efficiency gains under ‘ideal’ congestion pricing”. This has significant implications when 
implementation costs of various schemes are factored into an acceptability model 
(Forkenbrock, 2005; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002).   
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In investigating the road pricing experience of Lyon, France, Raux and Souche (2004, pg. 
194) also question the “universal validity of marginal cost pricing”, suggesting that, in order 
to be both acceptable and practicable, “pricing may have to deviate from the marginal cost 
principle” but, like Parry and the majority of the related literature, emphasises that this 
compromise “does not cast doubt on the pricing principle per se”.   
 
2.2 Road Pricing for Different Externalities 
Pricing measures are frequently endorsed as an efficient technique to “internalise the external 
costs” of transport, including (perhaps especially) road transport (Kinnock, 1995). Most 
prominently in the literature, road pricing is advocated as “an appropriate technique for 
alleviating traffic congestion and reducing environmental impacts” (Jaensirisak, Wardman 
and May, 2005, pg. 128). The latter is often divided into various sub-externalities: air 
pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and noise, among others (Button, 1990). Road safety is 
increasingly included in the spectrum of externalities that could potentially be addressed by 
road pricing policy (Calthrop and Proost, 1998). Roson (2000) also puts forward a model for 
including the availability and value of public transport alternatives in a private vehicle charge. 
This section will review the theory behind road pricing as it relates the two most prominent 
externalities in the road pricing literature: congestion and environmental factors.  
 
2.2.1 Congestion 
Congestion reduction is the most commonly cited objective of road pricing schemes. As will 
be discussed in greater depth in Section 3, problem perception is one of the greatest 
prerequisites for policy acceptability (Schade and Schlag, 2003; Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2007), 
and congestion is arguably the easiest problem to observe from the perspective of the average 
motorist. Road traffic congestion costs have been estimated at USD$9.3 billion in Los 
Angeles in 2005, USD$7.3 billion in New York in 2005 (Albalate and Bel, 2009), and 
AUD$3.5 billion in Sydney in 2005, and AUD$3.0 billion for Melbourne in 2005 (Council of 
Australian Governments, 2006). Road traffic congestion is an observable problem in most of 
the largest cities in the world (Taylor, 2002).  
 
These estimations of the economic cost of road congestion provide an indication, an order of 
magnitude, of the total additional price imposed upon road users. In order for road pricing to 
be effective in ameliorating (to some extent) road congestion in Sydney, revenues from road 
pricing would have to exceed $3.5billion (in 2005 dollars, at 2005 congestion levels). As 
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approximately 71.5492 billion vehicle kilometres were travelled on NSW roads in 2005 
(RTA, 2005a; RTA, 2005b), this would equate to a mean price per kilometre of $0.0492.  
 
2.2.2 Environmental Factors 
The negative environmental effects from transport are primarily air pollution, greenhouse gas 
emissions, and noise pollution (Calthrop and Proost, 1998; Kinnock, 1995), and are most 
often thought of in terms of detriment to human health (Parkhurst, 2004), however can also be 
measured in terms of localised vegetation changes (Rayfield et al., 1998) and even visual 
amenity (Wachs, 1993). While the measurement of the economic costs of externalities is 
consistently difficult, measuring the cost of environmental externalities has seemed 
particularly so, as standardising measurement of vegetation loss or noise impacts – for 
example – is far more complex than measuring or extrapolating hours spent in traffic, as is 
attributing a value to any measure. The exact impact of the burning of a litre of petrol may be 
relatively easier to quantify, but the inclusion of this measure into a pricing scheme – beyond 
the existent fuel levy (if indeed it is required beyond the fuel levy) – is still an obstacle. 
 
In terms of the acceptability problem, this difficulty in quantifying the economic costs of 
environmental impacts from road use is significant in two ways. As discussed in Section 3.1.1 
in greater depth, the perceived effectiveness and efficiency of the measures is important to 
public acceptability of road pricing measures, as is articulation of objectives or policy 
outcomes (Schade and Schlag, 2003). In the case of environmental impacts, if the value of 
these externalities cannot be readily determined, the ‘perceived effectiveness and efficiency’ 
is strongly undermined, which in turn compromises the ability of policy makers to articulate 
environmental benefits as a policy outcome.  
 
                                            
2 Note that this figure is meant only to provide an order of magnitude. The vehicle kilometres 
travelled (vkt) is taken from the entire state, whereas the economic cost is only for greater 
metropolitan Sydney, and as such the figure could be expected to be considerably higher. Also, 
this figure would represent the mean price, however in reality some users may pay more (those 
who travel in particular areas, at particular times, or in particular vehicles etc.) than others 
through price differentiation. This price represents the price for congestion only – internalising 
environmental and safety (or any other externality) costs would be additional to this.  
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2.3 Asset Management 
Road use has an effect on the physical integrity of the road asset. In order for the road asset to 
reach its full economic life, maintenance must be undertaken – the amount of maintenance 
required is directly proportionate to the amount of use of the road. As Adam Smith (1937, pg. 
683) so clearly articulated, “When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge ... pay 
toll in proportion to their weight … they pay for the maintenance of those public works 
exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce 
possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works”. Although Smith wrote 
over seventy years ago, the principle still applies. 
 
The need for marginal pricing in relation to asset wear – and therefore maintenance – lies in 
the current source of funding for that maintenance. In NSW, road maintenance is funded 
through a Treasury allocation to the Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW Treasury, 2009). This 
means that the money that is spent on road maintenance is sourced from general state taxes or 
commonwealth grants: either way it implies that “the cost burden is transferred from users to 
non-users” (Schweitzer and Taylor, 2008, pg. 809).  
While the provision of public infrastructure (the capital component) can justifiably be a 
general public expense – as it provides everyone with the opportunity to use a road – the costs 
incurred as a result of actual use (the recurrent component) should rightly be carried by those 
who cause them. The externality in this sense is not time, as it is with congestion, or 
respiratory irritations, as it may be with environmental impacts, but on the forgone benefit of 
taxation dollars that could otherwise be used to provide broader public value. 
 
Asset management arguments may present a way of framing the problem and potential 
solutions of road pricing such that many of the elements of acceptability (see Section 3) are 
satisfied, as “policy goals and objectives are established through consideration of a number of 
factors, including the economic and social impacts of transport infrastructure-related 
decisions” (Stalebrink and Gifford, 2005). In essence, thorough Transportation Asset 
Management3 practices translate policy decisions into observable services and results, which 
                                            
3 This concept is referred to as Transportation Asset Management in Stalebrink and Gifford 
(2005) in Button and Hensher (2005), and abbreviated to TAM. In the parlance of NSW 
Government, TAM stands for Total Asset Management, yet represents exactly the same set of 
principles, tools and systems. This variation may stem from the fact that the TAM approach is 
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may be a method of demonstrating benefits of road pricing schemes to both the public and 
decision makers that has not been explored in great depth in New South Wales.   
 
2.4 Road Pricing Case Studies 
The sample of urban areas from which to draw empirical analysis on road pricing is not large. 
Indeed, “while economists see road pricing as an attractive policy tool, most attempts to 
introduce economic incentives of this type in the transportation sector have failed” 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, pg. 358). Nonetheless, there is value in 
exploring the features of pricing models, the institutional environment and the broader context 
of cities that have successfully and unsuccessfully attempted road pricing implementation, 
identifying patterns between them. Those elements that are found to be contributing to the 
success or failure of a case study will be synthesised into a discussion of road pricing in 
Sydney in Section 5. 
Case studies on those cities that have successfully (a subjective and relative term) 
implemented a road pricing scheme are abundant in the literature. Given the relatively small 
number of cities to have implemented road pricing, the cities that are studied tend to fairly 
consistent: London, Singapore, Stockholm and the three Norwegian cities dominate the case 
study literature. In particular, Albalate and Bel (2009) assess these cities according to the 
framework described above, and de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen (2006) assess the same 
cities (as well as Brussels and Helsinki) in a similar (although not exactly the same) manner. 
The cases do not need repeating here, and as such this section will focus on three cases of 
failure (again, relative and subjective, and time-specific): New York, Edinburgh and 
Manchester. A brief summary of the elements of the success cases that contributed to their 
success will be given. 
 
Lindsey (2006, pp. 221-231) presents what are considered to be the key reasons for the 
political success of the London experience. Among fairly intuitive requisites such as “a robust 
scheme”, “sound research and analysis”, “cooperation” and “adequate funding”, the 
importance of a single transport authority, and the beginning of a new electoral cycle with a 
new leader and a relatively large margin are collectively described as “a set of circumstances 
that made it easier for him [Mayor Livingstone] to pursue such a radical policy than those that 
                                                                                                                                        
used across government in non-transport sectors (such as health and housing), and as such the 
Transportation Asset Management moniker would be inappropriate. 
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would apply to the leaders of many other cities. The Executive nature of the London 
Mayorship is also noted a being of significance, as it means the incumbent “does not have to 
secure the (continued) support of other politicians through the approval and implementation 
of [their] plans”. 
 
Singapore must, for obvious reasons relating to its political environment, be considered a 
unique case in the road pricing literature, however even though “one political party has 
dominated the government ... there are still some political barriers to effective pricing” 
(Christainsen, 2006, pg. 72). Nonetheless, the example of Singapore conjures some important 
points. Christainsen (2006, pg. 86-87) describes the ‘ideal’ model of road pricing, with highly 
differentiated prices applied broadly across the network with minimal transaction costs, as 
“market socialism”, where “prices being used to balance supply and demand” represents 
market aspects, and roadways, in general, remaining a nationalised industry being the socialist 
aspect. It is this balance – not a true dictatorship nor a truly socialist government – that may 
provide insight into some beneficial institutional arrangements for road pricing. 
 
Stockholm is here considered a success case only because it eventually did implement a road 
pricing scheme, albeit a heavily compromised one from that which was originally proposed. 
The Stockholm scheme was greatly frustrated by the diversity of the political environment in 
Sweden, and therefore the need for complex coalitions to form majority government. 
Ahlstrand (2001) notes that it was the articulation of the environmental benefits of the scheme 
that eventually garnered sufficient public acceptance for the scheme, despite the scheme being 
developed within government as a means of financing motorway expansion. The significance 
of environmental benefits to the Stockholm population may closely relate to the social norms 
described in Section 3.1.4. The Stockholm experience emphasises the power of the 
environmental lobby on a scheme that may nominally be focussed on congestion.  
 
For consistency and simplicity, the case studies presented here will use an expanded 
adaptation of a simple analysis framework presented by Albalate and Bel (2009). The simple 
analysis framework, which examines road pricing schemes or strategies for their public or 
political acceptability rather than their technical or operational viability, “helps identify where 
the bases of support and opposition are likely to lie, and how strong the sentiment is likely to 
be either for or against [road] pricing” (Albalate and Bel, 2009, pg. 964). The three areas of 
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focus in the framework are Fee Structure, Revenue Uses and Investments and Other Policy 
Impacts, and Political Impacts.  
 
Fee Structures relates to the amount charged, the method of collecting charges, and the degree 
of variability in a pricing scheme. Albalate and Bel (2009, pg 264) note that fee structures are 
relevant in the acceptability discourse as “each city has its own characteristics and mobility 
patterns”, and that “projects based on other cities plans and technologies can be seen as non-
credible by the public and by lobby groups, thus affecting acceptability”. Equity issues are 
also frequently cited as critical in the acceptability argument (Schade and Schlag, 2003). Fee 
structures can therefore also considerably affect acceptability, as broad-based, user-pays 
charging techniques have been shown to lessen the inequity (but not entirely remove it) in 
transportation costs compared to blunt, single facility tolls or non-user-pays methods of 
financing road infrastructure (such as from general taxation funds) (Schweitzer and Taylor, 
2008). 
 
The use of revenues derived from road pricing schemes is almost unanimously cited in the 
literature as a key aspect of public acceptability. In populations where taxation (transport 
related or otherwise) is already considered to be too high, or value is not seen to come from 
taxation levels, pricing may struggle to gain support if it is considered to be “just a tax 
increase by another name” (Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001, pg. 103). The 
‘earmarking’ of road pricing revenues for particular uses has been shown improve 
acceptability, in a multitude of studies, with many agreeing that the provision of extra public 
transport services and enhanced road infrastructure provides a greater positive impact than 
does using revenues to offset other tax reductions (Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001).  
 
‘Political impacts’ is used by Albalate and Bel (2009) as a catch-all term to describe three 
discrete concerns: activism within a community and the fact that smaller groups of ‘losers’ 
from any given policy are more easily organised and readily vocal than a large group of 
‘winners’; degrees of democratic government and the potential for divisive policies to be 
victims of partisan politics; and the layers of government involved in decision making. The 
latter of these three concerns will be addressed in greater depth later, as it emerged as a 
potentially important but under-represented issue in the literature, and where there were 
strongest differences of opinion in respondents and the literature.  
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2.4.1 New York 
Schaller (2010) presents an in-depth case study of the New York experience of road pricing 
reform. The scheme was first proposed as part of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s sustainability 
plan for New York in 2007. The plan was granted provisional funding by the United States 
Department of Transportation, conditional on the scheme being passed through the New York 
state legislature by April 2008. Despite broad support from a variety of interest groups, 
including the modification of the scheme to incorporate community input, the scheme stalled 
at the legislature and the window of opportunity for the scheme elapsed. New York is here 
referred to somewhat unflatteringly as a “failure” case study, however it should be noted that 
road pricing is still on the political agenda in New York, and this case study refers to a 
particular episode in this debate: there still very much exists the possibility of road pricing of 
some nature in New York.  
 
2.4.1.1 Fee Structure 
The respective fee structures of the two proposed New York schemes are outlined in the 
Figure 2 below. The Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission proposal was the result of 
extensive community consultation on the original (PlaNYC) scheme. Notable changes 
following the community consultation include a smaller geographic area (northern boundary 
of the charging zone amended from 86 Street to 60 Street), and fewer opportunities to charge 
(in-bound charging only). This is not surprising, as both amendments can only serve to make 
the scheme less expensive for some users, but not more expensive for any.  Such tempering of 
a proposed scheme is to be expected as more, and more diverse, stakeholders are involved in 
the planning or consultation process.  
 
 PlaNYC (April 2007) Traffic Congestion Mitigation 
Commission (Jan. 2008) 
Congestion 
Charge 
$8 daily fee for cars  
$21 daily fee for trucks - $7 for low-emission trucks 
$4 for cars travelling solely within the zone and $5.50 for trucks 
Same as PlaNYC, as 
well as $1 surcharge 
for cash payers 
Northern 
Boundary 
86 Street 60 Street 
Hours 6:00am to 6:00pm Same as PlaNYC 
Direction 
Charged 
In-bound, out-bound, and intra-zonal In-bound only 
Free Bypass Through trips using FDR drive and Route 9A not charged provided they do 
not enter surface streets 
No free bypass for 
through trips 
Toll offsets For E-ZPass users, the value of all tolls paid on bridges and tunnels in New 
York City (including Hudson River crossings) would be deducted from the 
fee up to $8 (cars) or $21 (trucks). No offset for cash payers 
Same as PlaNYC 
Exemptions The charge would apply to all vehicles, except emergency vehicles, transit 
vehicles, vehicles with handicapped license plates, medallion taxis, and 
neighbourhood car services (radio cars) 
No recommendation 
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Fee payment E-ZPass; drivers without E-ZPass would have their license plates recorded by 
cameras and payments could be made through the internet, via telephone call 
centre or at participating retail outlets 
Same as PlaNYC 
Figure 2: Fee Structure of proposed New York congestion pricing schemes.  
Source: City of New York, 2007, pp. 88-91, and Commission on Metropolitan Transport Authority 
Financing, 2008, pp. 63-64, both cited in Schaller, 2010, pg 269. 
 
2.4.1.2 Revenue Uses 
Detailed modelling and analysis of the proposed Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission 
scheme projected net revenues of the pricing scheme (after implementation and operational 
costs) of USD$491million per annum. These funds were to be allocated to a “lock box” 
account which was to be dedicated to public transport enhancements, but not road projects. 
The services to benefit most from the additional revenues were expanded local and express 
buses in the boroughs immediately neighbouring Manhattan, and increased frequency of 
subways services within Manhattan (Schaller, 2010, 266-268). 
 
2.4.1.3 Political Impacts  
At first glance, the New York scheme enjoyed almost unprecedented support from diverse 
stakeholders: the amended 2008 Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission’s scheme “was 
supported by Mayor Bloomberg, Governor David Paterson, a coalition of 135 civic, business, 
labor, environmental and advocacy groups and the editorial boards of all four major 
newspapers” and “received surprisingly little opposition from other suburban officials or 
groups” (Schaller, 2010, pg. 268).  
 
The condition placed on the funding ($354 million) of the scheme by the United States 
Department of Transportation was that it pass through the state legislature by April 2008. The 
state legislature consisted of representatives from across New York State, including elected 
officials from the metropolitan boroughs immediately neighbouring Manhattan who the most 
vehemently opposed to the plan: Queens and Brooklyn. Schaller (2010, pg. 269) importantly 
notes that these two boroughs “are more auto-dependent than neighborhoods closer to 
Manhattan and have the least rapid or convenient transit access to Manhattan jobs”. It would 
seem that the transit enhancements to be funded by road pricing revenues were not sufficient 
to overcome the equity and viable alternative concerns of these stakeholders. As a result, 
despite the Mayor’s office and the Metropolitan Transport Authority satisfying the needs of a 
majority of interest groups with the specifications of the scheme and the process of 
implementation, a minority of interest groups were able to stall the formal endorsement of the 
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proposal until the funding opportunity had elapsed; in essence turning a public acceptability 
issue into a cost viability one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment area Views of congestion pricing supporters Views of congestion pricing opponents 
Societal impacts Reduces traffic congestion  
Funds better mass transit Reduces air 
pollution  
Furthers the goals of sustainability, 
urban quality of life 
Reasonably discourages often-
unnecessary driving 
Congestion pricing targets ‘‘working person’’ 
driving to work, medical appointments, etc.  
Pricing represents social engineering by 
Manhattan-based elites  
Little impact on Manhattan traffic (trucks and 
taxis seen as main cause of congestion in 
central business district) 
Revenue will be diverted from the MTA  
MTA cannot be trusted to use new revenue for 
better service 
Impact on transit 
riders 
Funds better transit  
Transit improvements will absorb 
increased ridership from drivers 
switching to transit 
Trains and buses will be more crowded 
Impact on auto 
users 
Drivers will have reasonable transit 
alternative  
Will benefit drivers by reducing traffic 
congestion  
Transit is not and will not be viable alternative 
to driving  
Value of travel time savings (if any) not worth 
the $8 fee 
Figure 3: Summary of views on congestion pricing in New York City.  
Source: Schaller, 2010, pg. 269. 
 
2.4.2 Edinburgh 
The city of Edinburgh, Scotland, had spent over a decade debating the need for a congestion 
charge, and what a charging scheme may look like, by the time the proposal was 
overwhelmingly defeated by public referendum in 2005 (Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008). Gaunt, 
Rye and Ison (2008) present an in-depth account of the political experience of the Edinburgh 
congestion charge. 
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2.4.2.1 Fee Structure 
The fee structure of the proposed Edinburgh scheme is outlined in the table below. Many 
parallels can be drawn to the London scheme, especially in the technical details (ANPR 
technology) with a notable exception being that travel within a single cordoned area was free, 
unlike the London Licence Area Scheme. Also of note is the relatively small fee charged for 
travel across either or both cordons. This may reflect the smaller population, geographic area, 
and therefore potentially congestion levels, of Edinburgh, as well as socio-economic profiles, 
where £2 represents a relatively larger fee in Edinburgh than it may in the global finance 
centre of London.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inner cordon Outer cordon 
Congestion 
Charge 
£2 per day charge for crossing one or both of the cordons. 
Hours 7:00am to 6:30pm, Monday to Friday 7:00am to 10:00pm, Monday to 
Friday  
Direction 
Charged 
In-bound only In-bound only 
Free Bypass No free bypass, however travel solely within one cordon area was free (i.e. charge only incurred for 
crossing cordon, not being within area) 
Toll offsets None None 
Exemptions The charge would apply to all vehicles, except emergency 
vehicles, transit vehicles, vehicles with handicapped license 
plates, motorcycles, and city car club vehicles. 
Same 
Fee payment Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology used to track vehicles crossing of cordons. Pre-
payment with transport authority by phone, internet, SMS or at retail outlets. 
Figure 4: Fee structure of the proposed Edinburgh congestion charge.  
Source: Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008. 
 
2.4.2.2 Revenue Uses 
Economic modelling of the proposed Edinburgh scheme forecast net revenues “in the region 
of £760m ... over a 20-year period”, all of which, as part of the proposal, were to be 
hypothecated “for investment in public transport improvements”. Two interesting stipulations 
(among others) accompanied, as directed by the Scottish Executive (the equivalent of a 
national legislature, with authority of oversight for local council issues): public transport 
investment would have to precede the congestion charge (in effect requiring the funds to spent 
before they had been collected); and the revenues from the scheme to be directed to public 
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transport enhancements had to in addition to current and planned transport expenditure, not a 
substitute for it (Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008, pp. 646-647). 
 
2.4.2.3 Political Impacts  
Unlike New York, where public acceptance was achieved but political partisanship stifled the 
proposal, Edinburgh had a polity that was eventually reasonably supportive (or perhaps 
sufficiently supportive) of the proposed scheme, but was unable to convince the electorate to 
support it. Unlike the legislative defeat – a political vote – in New York, the Edinburgh was 
overcome by a referendum – a public vote.  
 
The complexity of the administrative burden in Edinburgh, and Scotland more generally, is 
surprisingly different to its United Kingdom counterpart London. The relationship between 
local authorities and the national executive, even on apparently local matters – where local 
authorities carry the burden of developing and promoting policy but the national executive has 
the power of veto at the “in-principle”, “in detail”, and “final” stages – “added time, expense 
and complexity to the process”, which may have in turn resulted in the disenchantment 
associated with “consultation fatigue” (Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008, pg. 646; Malyshev, 2006, 
pp. 287-288). 
 
The reasons cited for the failure to gain public acceptance of road pricing reform in Edinburgh 
resonate strongly with the acceptability literature: the two factors that were most influential in 
the unsuccessful outcome were a “disagreement on the objectives for the scheme and whether 
it would achieve them” and “public (mis-)understanding of how it was supposed to function” 
(Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008, pg. 659). 
 
2.4.3 Manchester 
The city of Manchester, in North-West England, is one of the more recent examples of failure 
to implement road pricing strategies. The proposal enjoyed initial support but as confusion 
around the details of the scheme increased, support for the plan decreased. The scheme had 
technical similarities to the Edinburgh model (two concentric cordons) however the political 
experience seems to more closely align to the New York experience, as implementation was 
contingent on capital from a higher level of government (Guardian News, 2007) As 
Manchester is a relatively recent case, no comprehensive analyses of the process or 
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experience can be found at this stage: information comes primarily from a variety of news 
sources and interest groups.  
 
2.4.3.1 Fee Structure 
The fee structure of the proposed Manchester congestion charge is outlined in the table below. 
The proposed Manchester scheme would have differentiated price more than many other 
‘failure’ cases (as well as many ‘success’ cases); differentiating by time, location (presumably 
as a proxy for congestion levels), but interestingly not be vehicle type. The Manchester 
scheme also proposed what is arguably the most sophisticated charge collection mechanism.  
 Outer cordon Inner cordon 
Congestion 
Charge 
£2 per crossing £1 per crossing 
Hours 7:00am to 9:30am, and 4:00pm to 6:30pm Monday to Friday Same as outer cordon  
Direction 
Charged 
In-bound only in morning peak, out-bound only in evening peak Same as outer cordon 
Free Bypass No free bypass, however travel solely within one cordon area was free (i.e. charge only incurred for 
crossing cordon, not being within area) 
Toll offsets None None 
Exemptions The charge would apply to all vehicles, except motorcycles, taxis 
and hire cars. 
Same 
Fee payment “Tag and Beacon” system – fee automatically charged to an account or credit card at the time of 
crossing. Pre-pay provisions for occasional drivers or for visiting vehicles from outside Manchester. 
Figure 5: Fee structure of the proposed Manchester congestion charge.  
Source: Greater Manchester Future Transport, 2008. 
 
2.4.3.2 Revenue Uses 
The Manchester proposal was part of a broader bid for funds from the national Department for 
Transport’s (DfT) Transport Innovation Fund. At the time of the bid, the DfT was offering a 
total of £3billion in grants for metropolitan areas to implement transport improvements. The 
DfT was also offering government loans, secured against future earnings of road pricing 
schemes. This presented a great financial opportunity for the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA), as revenues would have exceeded the income directly from 
the motorists (Guardian News, 2007) 
 
The proposal was to dedicate all revenues from the scheme to public transport enhancements, 
with notably no mention of any road enhancements (Greater Manchester Future Transport, 
2008). The specific expenditure of this revenue was supposed to be broad across public and 
active transport: “More buses, double-length trams and extra rail carriages ... park & ride 
spaces, more cycle routes, a cycle hire scheme ... 120 more Yellow School Buses ... More bus 
lanes and segregated busways, a second Metrolink city centre crossing” (Clean Air Now, 
2008) 
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2.4.3.3 Political Impacts  
The existence of multiple, individually represented boroughs within a single metropolitan 
area, similar to New York, appears to have been the ultimate downfall of the Manchester 
proposal. The bid to the national DfT was made by the highly factional AGMA, rather than 
the all-encompassing Greater Manchester County Council (for instance). The disunity that 
existed within the AGMA as result of perceived or actual equity issues around the scheme 
based on respective geographic circumstances undermined the strength of the plan that was 
sought to be developed. 
 
The social activism and organisation of interest groups strongly in favour or against the 
proposed scheme is also more widely documented than for other cases of implementation 
failure. News reports demonstrate a parallel debate occurring in Manchester between partisan 
political parties, borough representatives, but notably more so than other cases, between 
organisations of residents, business and labour groups. The interesting point here is not that 
there were groups opposed to the scheme, as these often to be expected, but that there were 
groups such as Clean Air Now and United City that were vocally in favour of the reform 
(Clean Air Now, 2008; Binns; 2008). This somewhat defies King, Manville and Shoup’s 
(2007, 114) assertion that “no one will be so much better off that they will take the lead to 
implement the program”. The complex and multiple political arenas that the road pricing 
debate was carried out in resulted in a public referendum at the end of 2008 where a 
significant majority voted against the proposal. 
The acceptability of road pricing: An application of a theoretical and analytical framework to the realities of decision making in Sydney 
                                                                                                                                                                         Palmer 
 
  page 23 
 
City “Success” Cases “Failure” Cases 
Feature London Singapore Stockholm Burgen/Oslo Manchester New York Edinburgh 
F
e
e
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
Implementation 2003/ extension 2007/  
removed 2010 
1975, 1998 
electronic upgrade 
2006 1986/1990 Referendum 2008 Legislative debate 
2008 
Referendum 2005 
Charging type Cordon (Camera 
controlled) 
Area Licensing 
Scheme 
Two cordon lines Toll cordons Two concentric 
cordon zones 
Area licence scheme 
single facility tolls  
Two concentric cordon 
zones 
Covered size 22km² 7km² 35km² - Approx 80miles² Approx 40km² - 
Hours charged 7:00am-6:00pm 
weekdays 
7:30am-7:30pm 
Mon-Sat 
24hrs weekdays 6:00am-
10:00pm/24h 
7:00-9:30am, 4:00-
6:30pm Mon-Fri 
6:00am-6:00pm 7 
days 
7:00am-10:00pm 
Toll differentiation Non-varying fee Time and vehicle 
varying 
Time varying Non-varying 
fee 
Time, location 
(congestion) 
By vehicle type Varying by geographic 
area 
Discounts and 
exemptions 
City  residents, 
motorcycles, 
emergency vehicles, 
public transport 
Vehicles entering 
10:00-12:00am, 
vehicles with >3 
passengers 
Traffic from Lidingo and 
Esseingeleden, emergency 
and ‘green’ vehicles, 
motorcycles, 
- Motorcycles, taxis 
and hire cars only. 
Emergency vehicles, 
public transport 
vehicles, Disabled 
persons 
None detailed 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
U
s
e
s
 
Revenue/cost ratio 
(2008) 
2.04 508 3.45 Unknown - - - 
Revenue use 
(hypothecation) 
Road works, public 
transport 
enhancements, road 
safety, active transport 
Not disclosed Public transport projects 
(social democratic 
government) arterial roads 
(conservative government) 
Road projects 
only 
Public transport 
enhancements only. 
Dedicated to 
transportation 
investments 
All revenue to be 
hypothecated to public 
transport and road 
projects, and to be 
treated as “additional”. 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
Impact on 
congestion 
30% reduction long 
run, recent increase in 
congestion 
40% reduction, 
15% reduction 
electronic tolling 
19% reduction in 
congestion 
Negligible 
effects 
15% reduction in 
inner-city congestion 
30% reduction 
forecast (Manhattan) 
21% reduction on inner-
city, 9% overall 
(forecast) 
Impact on 
pollution 
16% decline in CO2 
emissions 
Unknown 8-14% reduction in 
emissions 
Unknown  - - Not forecast 
Political levels 
involved 
Municipal/metropolita
n (Greater London 
Authority 
Only one level in 
country 
National and municipal 
governments 
National and 
municipal 
governments 
Local/municipal and 
national 
Metropolitan, 
Boroughs, State 
Legislature 
Municipal/metropolitan 
and national 
Political support Government support 
(Labour) Opposition 
against 
(Conservatives) 
Government 
support (pseudo-
dictatorship) 
Government support 
(democratic) Opposition 
against (conservatives) 
Government 
and opposition 
support 
Inner-city boroughs,  Metropolitan 
support, Boroughs 
against 
Government support 
(Labour) Opposition 
against (conservative) 
Public opinion Support Acceptability 
gained 
Support in city of 
Stockholm, opposed in 
surrounding cities 
Against Very divided, highly 
vocal and political. 
Majority support, 
with reservations as 
to revenue uses 
In-principle support, 
neighbouring areas 
against. 
Figure 6: Summary of road pricing features and experiences  
Sources: Framework and “success” data from Albalate and Bel 2009, “failure” cases data from Rye, Gaunt and Ison (2008), Schaller 2010, Greater Manchester Future 
Transport, 2008.
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3 The Acceptability Problem 
The barriers to road pricing policy and implementation are far political than technical. Road 
pricing strategies, in many various forms and in many different countries, are “frequently 
discussed and debated, but seldom implemented” (Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2007, pg. 86). As 
charge collection technology has become increasingly sophisticated, accessible and relatively 
affordable, so too have the technical feasibility related reasons for non-implementation 
become fewer. Acceptability, as discussed in the literature, is comprised of various elements, 
and can be thought of in terms of political acceptability and public acceptability: two concepts 
that are clearly related but should not be conflated. 
 
This section will distinguish between political acceptability and public acceptability, and will 
summarise elements of each that have been identified in the literature. It will seek to outline 
those “more controversial aspects potentially ignored of or left for future discussion” that 
result in “the outcome of [the political bargaining] process not being ‘optimal’ in a technical 
sense” (Miller and Meyer, 2001, pg. 64). These elements may be generic to the public policy 
environment, specific to transport policy, or specific to road pricing, as literature relating to 
each has been consulted. Also, the dominant phraseology for concepts in the literature has 
been adopted: where different articles clearly address the same issue but by different names, 
the most prevalent name has been used here.  
 
These concepts are drawn from a literature on theoretical assessments of road pricing 
acceptability (Viegas, 2001; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002; Albalate and Bel, 
2009; Parry, 2002; Roson, 2000); empirical research on acceptability but not limited to a 
specific context or case (Jaensirisak, Wardman and May, 2005; Harrington, Krupnick and 
Alberini, 2001; Schade and Schlag, 2003; de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen, 2006; Schweitzer 
and Taylor, 2008); and a literature of acceptability in specific road pricing case studies (Roux 
and Souche, 2004; Ahlstrand, 2001; Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2010; O’Mahony, Geraghty and 
Humphreys, 2000; Schaller, 2010; Richards, 2006).  
 
The cumulative findings from Section 3 below will be used as the basis for structuring 
Section 4, and the relevance and implications of each to Sydney will be addressed in Sections 
4 and 5. At this point, a theoretical understanding of each element is being sought, and a 
comparative attribution of importance as derived from the literature.  
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Previous studies into the acceptability of road pricing have largely focussed on public 
acceptability, with an implicit assumption that public acceptability is synonymous with 
political acceptability – “The political acceptability of congestion fees remains a serious 
barrier to their wider use, and there is intense interest amongst policy makers in ways to make 
congestion pricing less objectionable to motorists” (Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001, 
pg. 88. Emphasis added by author). This research does not hold that assumption to be true in 
all circumstances: political acceptability is a complex set of issues of which public 
acceptability may only be one (Meyer and Miller, 2001).   
 
Figure 7 represents various elements of both political and public acceptability collected from 
the literature. It does not represent a hierarchy - no single element of the acceptability is 
subordinated to another in importance or relevance; it merely demonstrates that public 
acceptability is a subset of political acceptability. Also, elements that are represented as being 
a component of public acceptability may also have a direct impact on political acceptability: 
problem perception, for instance, may strongly influence political acceptability of a proposal 
in and of itself, not only as it affects public acceptability. Indeed in such an example the 
perceptions of the nature or severity of a problem may be radically different between 
stakeholders.  
 
The various elements of acceptability, both public and political, are also very much 
interconnected. Viegas (2001, pp. 293-294) demonstrates this in one short passage, linking 
notions of problem perception, policy objectives, communication, perceived effectiveness and 
equity issues, writing of economists and politicians: “the former have adopted a far more 
restricted set of the objectives, giving too much emphasis to the issue of efficiency, which are 
hard to understand and convey to the population, and paying less attention to the more visible 
aspects of effectiveness of congestion relief and equity”.  
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3.1 Public Acceptability 
The diverse elements of public acceptability make up the majority of the broader acceptability 
literature. A description, analysis or attribution of importance has variously been sought to be 
given for these elements on the basis of political economy, population composition in terms 
of socio-economic, gender and racial characteristics and the nature of government. 
Nonetheless, despite the diversity of approaches to the issue, “public aversion to congestion 
pricing is well-accepted among transportation planners and policymakers” (Harrington, 
Krupnick and Alberini, 2001, pg. 103).  
 
3.1.1 Perceived Effectiveness of Solutions 
Road pricing schemes must be considered to be effective and, to some extent also efficient, if 
they are to gain public acceptability: “lower perceived effectiveness usually correlate with 
lower acceptability of the particular measure, and vice versa” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 
49). Viegas (2001, pg. 291) expands this notion to be the “quality of the mobility system”, 
where the effectiveness is not considered for the pricing scheme in isolation, but its 
contribution to the effectiveness of the transport network as a whole. 
 
When travel time savings are used as a proxy measure for the perceived effectiveness of a 
solution, studies have shown that while “the coefficient of driving minutes saved is positive”, 
it is “not significant in the conventional levels” (Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001, pg. 
102). Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005), similarly using travel time savings as a proxy 
Political 
acceptability
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Costs
Problem 
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effectiveness of 
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Figure 7: Elements of political and public acceptability 
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for scheme effectiveness, found a similar correlation, noting that the positive correlation was 
far less than that of the size of that charge itself. This finding is further reinforced by Schade 
and Schlag (2003). 
 
Taking the findings of the literature considered simultaneously, the perceived effectiveness of 
a road pricing scheme can be seen to have positive effect on acceptability, with varying 
degrees of significance. The range of significance can nonetheless be interpreted as being 
between low and moderate: studies agree that while perceived effectiveness does influence 
acceptability, other elements can do far more so. 
 
3.1.2 Problem Perception 
The ‘problems’ that road pricing may seek to address are potentially many and varied, 
however the two main issues for which empirical work exists are congestion and 
environmental issues such as air pollution, greenhouse gas emission and noise. Interestingly, 
the focus on one of these issues or the other has been observed to influence the acceptability 
of road pricing schemes between cohorts: “exactly the groups perceiving traffic congestion as 
one of the biggest problems reject road pricing more strongly than groups perceiving mainly 
environmental problems” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 48) and “survey evidence indicates 
that this [motorists concerns with private vehicle use] is not congestion per se, but 
environmental issues: thus we would make the improvement of the natural environment the 
cornerstone of our program” (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, pg. 367). 
Nonetheless, the general hypothesis is that “a high problem awareness will lead to increased 
willingness to accept solutions for the perceived problems” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 
48). 
 
This hypothesis is confirmed to some extent by Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, (2001, pg. 
102), who observe that “in all specifications ... the coefficient of rating of the congestion 
problem is positive and strongly significant”, and by Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005, 
pp. 145-146), who note that “Acceptance levels ... are relatively high amongst those who 
perceive their current travel situation to be unacceptable, [and] those who perceive congestion 
and pollution problems to be very serious... The figure is a little lower for those with no 
strong dislike of charging. For those who do not have these attitudes, the acceptance levels are 
low.” 
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Taken collectively, the literature suggests that problem perception – the awareness of the 
existence and severity of some negative product of vehicle use – does have a relatively strong 
and positive correlation with acceptability of pricing schemes, keeping in mind that specific 
‘problems’ (congestion and environmental concerns) may provide variance within this 
element, as noted above. 
 
3.1.3 Clear and Valid Policy Goals 
Policy goals logically follow from perceived problems (above) however may also include 
revenue generation, and asset preservation. These policy goals may be seen to provide net 
benefits (and/or losses) to society, which may or may not be in conflict with mobility related 
goals of individuals. As an example, the net environmental benefits to society of reduced 
private vehicle use is in conflict with the mobility losses to some individuals who may be 
priced out of some journeys. The hypothesis here is that “a higher valuation of common social 
aims will be positively related to acceptability of road pricing, while pursuing personal gain 
maximising aims may lead to a refusal of road pricing” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 48). 
 
The identification of survey respondents as being – bluntly – ‘selfish’ or ‘altruistic’, either 
directly or by use of some proxy is not prominent in the literature. Tenuously, it can said that 
Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005, pg. 145) provide some support for this hypothesis in 
noting that “there is a very large difference [in pricing acceptability] between car users and 
non-car users”, however car use, or not, can be attributed to many more factors than simply 
altruistic or selfish tendencies. Similarly, the only parallel to be drawn from Harrington, 
Krupnick and Alberini (2001, pp.100-102) is that those who voted Democrat (traditionally, 
but also stereotypically, more socialist leaning) demonstrated far stronger support for pricing 
strategies than those who identified as Republican (traditionally, and also stereotypically, 
more individualist leaning). These should be considered indicative evidence only. The 
strongest evidence relating to this element of acceptability can be found in Schade and Schlag 
(2003, pg. 57), who demonstrate that the importance of societal aims has a far smaller 
predictive ability for pricing acceptability than most other elements: greater than only internal 
attribution of responsibility. 
 
The articulation of intended outcomes, as described in Section 3.1.2, is highly predictive of 
pricing acceptability. Taken collectively, the literature does not provide great support for the 
notion that personal bias towards societal or individual benefits has a significant impact on 
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acceptability, with the most salient point being “the importance to politicians of taking into 
account the views of non-car users” (Jaensirisak, Wardman and May, 2005, pg. 145). 
 
3.1.4 Mobility Related Social Norms 
Mobility related social norms, such as the “American love affair with their vehicles” (Taylor, 
2001, pg. 12) refer to the internal inertia of behaviours and habits, and to the pressures 
associated with the opinions and preferences of important or referent individuals (Jakobsson, 
Fujii and Garling, 2000). In practice this means the willingness of an individual to change 
their transport behaviours, and the effect of the opinion of a spouse, parent, or friend on 
transport choices. The hypothesis here is that “the more favourable the perceived social norm 
is with a presented pricing strategy, the stronger should be an individual’s acceptability of the 
strategy” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 48). 
 
Little statistical evidence exists to measure the predictive ability of this element on overall 
acceptability. The only statistical study consulted to directly address the issue found mobility 
related social norms to be a very strong indicator of acceptability: “one surprising result is that 
social norm has the most predictive power of all variables ... a kind of striving for 
concordance between own preferences and the ones of important others has emerged” 
(Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 59). Mobility related social norms have also emerged in the 
cases. Most notably, Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005, pg. 148) observed consistently 
lesser acceptability levels of like-for-like pricing schemes for respondents in the city of Leeds 
compared to those in London, after accounting for other variables such as the provision of 
alternatives in those cities, and surmise that in London, there is simply “a more favourable 
climate towards road pricing”. Similarly, the rejection of road pricing at public referendum in 
2005 has been largely attributed to the lack of appreciation of policy makers to understand the 
cultural significance of car use to the Edinburgh population, who saw the proposed pricing 
scheme as “insufficient, irrelevant, or ill-defined” (Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2010, pg. 100). 
 
While measuring social norms relating to transport and mobility is difficult, and translating 
results between studies equally so, the general consensus within the literature is that social 
norms are a critical factor, perhaps surprisingly so, in overall acceptability.  
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3.1.5 Equity Issues and Socio-Economic Impacts 
While equity issues and socio-economic outcomes are frequently noted separately in the 
literature, they are often treated concurrently. This research will follow this lead. A vast 
literature exists on equity and acceptability in road pricing strategies. Viegas (2001, pg. 291) 
distinguishes equity issues into “longitudinal equity – having to pay for what was previously 
freely available and taken by many to be a basic right” and “vertical equity – the risk of 
exclusion from a wide range of urban functions for those with little revenue available for the 
extra cost of driving into the city”. Raux and Souche (2004, pp.195-196) also identify sub-
groupings of equity: “spatial equity” which refers to equal “right of access to jobs, goods and 
services from any location”; “vertical equity” as above; and “horizontal equity” which refers 
to consistent application of the user pays principle.  
 
Raux and Souche (2004) and Viegas (2001) here represent a sub-category of the literature 
who equates equity with acceptability throughout their analyses, and in doing so imply that 
acceptability is limited to equity issues, or at least that equity has clear primacy over other 
elements of acceptability. This research clearly does not agree with this limitation, however 
the insights provided from their work on equity issues is still considered valuable. 
 
Equity issues and socio-economic impacts represent the point of greatest disagreement within 
the literature. A fair base hypothesis would be that “the more people perceive advantages 
following the introduction of road pricing, the more likely they will be to accept it” (Schade 
and Schlag, 2003, pg. 50). However evidence and academic opinion vary widely. Schade and 
Schlag found that while personal outcome expectations (an individual being better or worse 
off after scheme implementation) had a very strong influence on overall acceptability, relative 
equity (spatial/geographic or socio-economic) had very little. Interestingly, however, “it could 
be shown that these groups [higher income groups] are more likely to expect advantages from 
the strategies, whereas lower income groups tend to expect disadvantages” (Schade and 
Schlag, 2003, pg. 58) regardless of scheme design. Similarly, Harrington, Krupnick and 
Alberini (2001, pg. 102) noted that “against our expectations ... the [income] coefficient is 
very small, and both its magnitude and significance level drop as we add other respondent 
characteristics”, and “surprisingly, the sensitivity to the charge does not vary with the income 
group” (Jaensirisak, Wardman and May, 2005, pg. 143). 
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Despite hypothesising relative significance of equity issues and socio-economic impacts, the 
major statistical studies consulted for this research failed to provide strong evidence for these 
claims. However in focussing almost solely on equity and socio-economic concerns, the 
branch of the literature represented by Raux and Souche (2004) and Viegas (2001) clearly has 
a strong belief that equity is of strong significance in overall acceptability, with 
(unsubstantiated) assertions such as “acceptability is strongly connected with the perception 
of fairness” (Viegas, 2001, pg. 290). 
 
This research does not seek to identify which school of thought on this particular topic may be 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘better’ or ‘worse’, but to identify this divergence within the literature as 
an area of further exploration, and to relate this finding to the broader comparison of the wider 
literature with real-world perceptions.  
 
3.1.6 Attribution of Responsibility 
Attribution of responsibility can be distinguished into two concepts: responsibility for 
problem causation – an awareness and acceptance (or not) of one’s own contribution to some 
negative societal product; and responsibility for problem solving – “to whom the 
responsibility to solve the problem is attributed” (Schade and Schlag, 2003, pg. 50). The 
hypothesis here is that “if the individual is considered at least partly responsible to solve the 
problems [and for generating them in the first instance], this should lead to increased 
agreement with measures raising the price of or restricting the use of the car” (Schade and 
Schlag, 2003, pg. 50). 
 
Attribution of responsibility was found, in the only statistical study consulted for this research 
to address it, to “contribute to the explanation of acceptability to a negligible extent” (Schade 
and Schlag, 2003, pg. 59). Other studies have not assessed other criteria that may at least be 
used as a proxy for this element of acceptability; however its overall omission from the 
literature, combined with one unflattering result, may indicate that is a relatively unimportant 
element to be considered here. 
 
3.1.7 Use of Revenues and Provision of Alternatives 
“The use of revenue from road pricing is of central importance for public support” (Ahlstrand, 
2001, pg. 486). This sentiment is echoed throughout the road pricing acceptability literature. 
While it is generally acknowledged that the use of revenues from road pricing strategies is a 
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key concern for public acceptability, what the precise beneficiary of the revenues should be 
does not enjoy the same concurrence: “accountability on the application of revenues becomes 
an integral part of the approach” (Viegas, 2001, pg. 294) 
 
Jaensirisak, Wardman and May (2005, pp. 143-144) found a “lack of any strong preference 
between the use of the revenue raised for tax reductions or public transport”. This study 
emphasised the split between car-users and non-car users in their sample, and how these 
groups may be inclined to prefer tax reductions and public transport enhancements 
respectively. Alternatively, (Schweitzer and Taylor (2008) present a compelling economic 
argument for revenues to be directed specifically to transport initiatives on equity grounds, 
however their analysis does not refer explicitly to acceptability. Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-
Hannemann (2002, pg. 363) espouse “compensating in the same dimension”; using road 
pricing revenues specifically for road network enhancements as opposed to public transport 
improvements or tax reductions. Their argument is that by directing revenues sourced from 
road users to improvements that will most benefit road users, the likelihood of public 
acceptability will be increased.  
 
Goodwin (1989) suggests hypothecating road pricing revenues based on maximising support 
among various stakeholder groups and compensating those who may lose the most from a 
scheme (although these two groups may not be mutually exclusive). The “rule of three” 
suggests allocating a third of road pricing revenues to road improvements, a third to public 
transport improvements, and a third to “the general fund of the city” (Goodwin, 2989, cited in 
King, Manville and Shoup, 2005, pg. 8), which in NSW is referred to as the ‘consolidated 
fund’. The “rule of three” makes a simple but important assertion, regardless of the exact 
proportions (exact thirds may not be necessary), or even the exact uses of the funds (other 
uses may be deemed equally deserving in various contexts): that road pricing revenues need 
not be allocated to only one beneficiary, and that by expanding the breadth of beneficiaries, 
public and political support will likely be expanded also.  
 
The case studies demonstrate that hypothecation of revenues to either road improvements or 
public transport enhancements (or a combination of both) were a feature of all of the success 
cases, and a stipulation of political opposition in the cases that weren’t successful (use of 
revenues in Singapore was not evident in the case study consulted, however as Singapore has 
a markedly different government style to the other cases, hypothecation may not be as critical 
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in that context) (Lindsey, 2006; Schaller, 2010; Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2007; Raux and 
Souche, 2004; O’Mahony, Geraghty and Humphreys, 2000). None of the cases observed used 
road pricing revenues for broader tax reductions. Without labouring the point, it is apparent 
from the literature that the hypothecation of revenues from road pricing strategies towards 
some transport related improvement (road or public transport) is a fundamental component of 
gaining public acceptability for those strategies.  
 
3.2 Technical Feasibility 
The technical feasibility of implementing a road pricing strategy is an obvious constraint 
within the considerations of political acceptability (Forkenbrock, 2005). The feasibility of 
implementing a particular scheme is not as great a concern within public acceptability, 
beyond how effective that scheme is perceived to be (see Section 3.1.1). Technical feasibility, 
like costs, is a parameter within which decision makers must choose the most suitable 
“alternative within limited resources and the ability of the decision maker to acquire and 
process information” (Miller and Meyer, 2001, pg. 61). Within the evolution of road pricing 
practice, “the costs of implementing a reliable tolling system have fallen” (Calthrop and 
Proost, 1998, pg. 335), and as such is becoming less and less of a constraint. 
 
3.3 Costs 
The costs of implementation are a constraint on public policy in a general sense. If funds are 
not available, either due to dire fiscal circumstances or simply an unjustifiable minimum 
expense of a policy proposal, to procure the necessary technology, infrastructure, labour, and 
to service ongoing maintenance, operating and perhaps finance costs, then no amount of 
public acceptability will ensure implementation. In the instance of road pricing, the costs 
associated with implementation vary widely according to scheme design, however broadly 
they may be thought of as some technology and infrastructure to capture vehicle movements, 
such as overhead gantries with electronic beacons; some in-vehicle technology to identify 
vehicles, such as an electronic “tag” (the cost of which may be carried by the government or 
the motorist); potentially some concessions to affected groups in the form of rebates or 
similar; the administrative cost of policy development; and ongoing administration costs. The 
latter should not be underestimated, as the London experience has shown that operational or 
administration costs can become the single greatest burden on a pricing scheme (Lindsey, 
2006). 
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However unlike many policy initiatives, road pricing by definition has the ability to recoup 
some of its own fixed and variable, or establishment and ongoing, costs. Nonetheless, cost-
effectiveness, similar to the concept of ‘efficiency’, may sway decisions makers preferences 
between schemes: “cost-effectiveness is likely to be particularly high when problems vary 
across space and time: charges can reflect these differences, whereas rules…tend to coincide 
with jurisdictional boundaries” (Kinnock, 1995, pg. 8). Costs, both establishment and 
ongoing, should not (or at least need not) be a prohibitive constraint on road pricing policy: 
“in a well-run country no conflict need arise between the goals of designing an equitable and 
efficient system of road-use charges and taxes and the desire to cover the highway system's 
costs” (Newbery, 1990, pg 23).  
 
3.4 Other Political Impacts 
The broader political impacts – either intrinsic to the policy making and setting environment 
or external to it – are the “dimensions of the problem that economists are not seeing” (Viegas, 
2001, pg. 289). Indeed, “once rational ignorance and the influence of groups are taken into 
account, the set of policy instruments that is employed in political equilibrium can deviate 
significantly from the instruments a social planner would use” (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-
Hannemann, 2002, pg. 365). 
 
Internal political influencers can generally be thought of as the nature of partisan politics – 
“congestion charging can become caught up in traditional divisions between political parties” 
(Albalate and Bel, 2009, pg. 965). In each of cases explored, with the sole exception of 
Oslo/Burgen, a road pricing proposal put forward by the government of the day experienced 
resistance from the opposition of the day: this occurred despite no notable consistency of 
political ideologies of the governments and oppositions respectively. The experiences of 
Edinburgh, Manchester and New York support the notion that “the planning of transportation 
systems is as much a political process as it is a technical one” (Miller and Meyer, 2001, pg. 
58). 
 
Albalate and Bel (2009, pg. 963) note that “benefits and costs of a prospective policy promote 
the birth of interest groups that will also play an important role in the implementation 
process”. These interests may not represent the opinion or interests of a majority of all people: 
“in political equilibrium, policies match the preferences of well organised interests 
(automobile associations) better than the preferences of more dispersed groups (citizens who 
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consume polluted air). In general, smaller groups are easier to organise than larger groups” 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, pg. 364). This was certainly the case in New 
York, where a minority of groups representing a minority of the population sufficiently 
frustrated the road pricing proposal to ultimately derail it (Schaller, 2010).  
 
3.5 Levels/Layer of Government 
The plethora of influencers that could conceivably be considered “other political factors” is 
exhaustive. This research will focus on the ‘layers’ of government that exist in a given 
decision making context, and the particular ‘level’ of government that holds primary 
responsibility for transport related decisions. This focus was inspired by an observation that, 
in general, the successful cases had been implemented by a metropolitan authority – the 
‘level’ of government with the most narrow focus – rather than a state (or equivalent) or 
national authority. Kinnock (1995, pg. iii) distinguishes these layers in the instance of 
European Union membership: “Since some transport policies are formulated at the 
Community level (e.g. vehicle standards, minimum fuel excises etc.), whilst others are 
introduced by Member States, there is need for a broad agreement on the policy approach in 
order to ensure consistency. This is also necessary to safeguard the efficient functioning of the 
internal market and to take account of cross-border effects.” 
 
In assessing the net impacts on transport policy in Brussels, one study found that “lack of 
coordination between the governments resulted in a welfare loss relative to the cooperative 
outcome” and that it “depends on the degree to which the jurisdictions of governments 
overlap, the sharing rules for revenue, and the strategic interdependence between the policy 
instruments” (de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen, 2006, pg. 158). This assessment was of a 
jurisdiction that has only two layers of government: a fair assumption is that such ‘welfare 
losses’ are at least proportionate (perhaps even exponentially related) with additional layers of 
government. Albalate and Bel (2009, pg. 965) suggest how this may take effect: “the 
existence of different political levels where incumbent parties are different and rivals may 
become an important obstacle for congestion pricing implementation. Then, political 
controversy can arise more easily when different parties control different stages of the 
decision process”.  
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4 Interview Results 
As outlined in Section 1, an objective of the research is to identify discrepancies in what is 
considered pertinent to the acceptability problem of road pricing in the literature compared to 
what may be considered pertinent to the same debate in a real-world context. This ‘real world’ 
context is a sample of expert individuals within government, academia and industry in NSW, 
each of whom have some interest in road pricing in Sydney, and each of whom bring a 
distinct perspective to the conversation based on diverse professional backgrounds and 
interests. The purpose of the interviews was to test the wisdom presented in the literature, 
against the informed thoughts and opinions of the sample group, who collectively may be 
thought of as ‘practitioners’. The interviews also sought to provide the practitioners with the 
opportunity to add to the debate; to go beyond what had been prescribed in the literature if 
there were any elements of the acceptability problem that were deemed missing.   
 
Nine semi-structured interviews were undertaken with various transport officials, economists, 
academics, political officers and operators in the road freight industry. Interviews lasted 
between 1 hour and 2 hours, and a mix of questions was formulated to be sufficiently broad to 
capture a wide variety of issues, as well as sufficiently targeted to gain insight from each 
respondent’s area of expertise or unique perspective. Respondents were asked a mix of open 
ended questions (i.e. “What issues do you think…”), as well as prompted/leading questions 
(i.e. “Do you think the decision making environment in NSW is conducive to…”). This 
approach is consistent with that espoused by McNabb (2008, 2009).  
 
The nine respondents come from a variety of professional backgrounds, outlined below (A 
more detailed account is provided in Appendix 1): 
• Respondent 1 – Senior Transport official in NSW State Government. 
Background in NSW state politics (Office of Minister for Roads). 
• Respondent 2 – Senior manager for road use management in NSW State 
Government. Background in law. 
• Respondent 3 – Head of peak body of Australian road authorities. Background 
as a social economist. 
• Respondent 4 – Transport academic at leading Transport and Logistics school in 
Australia. Background in planning in NSW State Government. 
• Respondent 5 – Senior Transport official in NSW State Government. 
Background in Treasury and social policy. 
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• Respondent 6 – Senior Transport official in NSW State Government. 
Background as a civil engineer. 
• Respondent 7 – Senior manager in Australian Nation Heavy Vehicle Regulator. 
Background in freight policy. 
• Respondent 8 – Transport economist at leading global professional services firm.  
• Respondent 9 – Manager in a leading Australian logistics firm. Background in 
motoring organisation.  
 
The results have here been group by the themes presented in the Section 3 to draw 
comparisons across responses.  
 
4.1 Perceived Effectiveness of Solutions 
There was unanimous consensus within the sample group that the perceived effectiveness of 
solutions, in principle, is a critical factor in the acceptability of road pricing schemes. 
Different respondents had different interpretations on who may be doing the ‘perceiving’, and 
what constituted ‘effectiveness’. Respondent 1 saw the public as the main consumer of 
information relating to the effectiveness of , stating that “good policy makes good politics”, 
implying that if the road pricing ‘product’ is sound, then it will be acceptable, firstly to the 
public and then to decision makers.  
 
Respondent 5 saw the decision makers as those ultimately doing the ‘perceiving’, and also 
highlighted the importance of framing notions of ‘effectiveness’ in a manner that is suitable to 
the intended audience: “The cabinet minute that has been put up for the last fifteen years, it’s 
the same every time, it’s so esoteric and doesn’t tell them the real benefits”. In elaborating, 
the cabinet minute being referred to detailed the benefits of proposed road pricing strategies in 
very technical terms such as road smoothness, asset life and sweeping statements about 
congestion abatement.  
 
Respondent 2 noted the difficulty in communicating benefits in a problematically circular 
policy environment: “the benefits of mass-distance charging as opposed to single facility or 
corridor charging are likely to be very different to different people. Until we get approval to 
pursue one or the other or anything else, we can’t go wandering down avenues hoping that 
that’s the one they go with.” 
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Interestingly, the perceived effectiveness could be seen to be closely linked to other elements 
of acceptability, especially equity issues within and between stakeholder groups, and was 
noted as not necessarily being a positive to all interest groups: respondent 7 noted that “the 
problem with the freight industry is they know what an effective scheme means for them too 
well. The more effective the scheme is the worse off they think they will be”. This implies the 
need for a more nuanced approach to communicating the benefits (and costs) of any proposed 
pricing scheme to groups differentiated by industry, geography and transport habits. 
 
The effectiveness of road pricing was also suggested to be dependent on the existing or 
proposed transport policies that exist around it: “single policy issues become polarising, and 
pricing is not a silver bullet” (respondent 1) and “we need to implement it within a suite of 
road use, and transport use, management policies” (respondent 6). 
 
4.2 Problem Perception 
Problem perception was also cited by a majority of respondents as being an important factor 
in the public and political acceptability. While there was general acknowledgement that 
government (both the bureaucracy and elected officials) were aware of congestion issues in 
Sydney, only two respondents made any reference to “problems” outside the realm of 
congestion. This has a direct link to item 4.3, “clear and valid policy goals”.  
 
Respondent 8 distinguished between problems for governments and problems for individuals: 
“most people have an idea of a problem, and I’m sure most people could name something that 
they’re unhappy with about the transport in Sydney. But problems mean different things to 
different people. The government is aware of the problem of economic costs of congestion 
and the increasing consumption of energy, whereas someone living in the suburbs sees that 
problem as ‘It takes me and hour and a half to get to work and I keep paying more for 
petrol’.” 
 
An observation was made that drew problem perception directly into the context of Sydney: 
“people in Sydney think that the problem [referring to congestion] is bad, but it’s not bad 
enough [to justify road pricing]. They expect a certain level of it, and accept a certain level of 
it. It will have to get worse for a majority of people to support it [pricing]”.  
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4.3 Clear and Valid Policy Goals 
The articulation of clear and valid policy goals was generally agreed as an important 
influencer of policy acceptability. Notably, this was most obvious within the academic, 
political and private industry respondents, and less so among government respondents.  
 
The tension between breadth of benefits and focus of action was articulated by respondent 4 – 
“while it’s all nice to tell people that we’re able to reduce congestion by so much, or reduce 
pollution by so much, and tell them all the other benefits we may expect, governments need to 
clearly articulate what it is they are trying to achieve, it’s absolutely critical”. 
 
An opinion was given that, despite road pricing schemes being adopted in other cities with 
congestion abatement being the primary publicly stated policy goal of the scheme, it was in 
fact lobbying from different interest groups that drove implementation: “in all the other cities, 
London, Amsterdam, the Norwegian ones, they got up on environmental grounds. They might 
have been called congestion charges, but it was the environmentalists that got them up” 
(respondent 6).  
 
The perspective of the ‘consumer’ of road use is interesting in this theme, and may imply that 
clear and valid policy goals, in reality, need to be augmented with notions of government 
integrity: “they’ve told us that it’s about the user paying for the damage and the congestion, 
and I guess you can see the economics behind it all, but at the end of the day it’s hard not to 
think of it as a bit of a cash-grab” (respondent 9). 
 
4.4 Mobility Related Social Norms 
Mobility related social norms was generally not considered by the respondents to be an 
important element of road pricing acceptability in general, or specifically in Sydney. When 
asked to comment on the notion that Sydneysiders may be ‘wedded to their cars’, the general 
sentiment was “there might be something like that there, but if they are given good 
alternatives and the benefits to them are made clear, then I don’t think it’s much of an issue” 
(respondent 4) and “it maybe to some extent, but I think there are more important issues to 
overcome before we worry too much about that” (respondent 2). 
 
Although not recognising mobility related social norms as a critical issue, respondent 1 made 
a relevant observation about the potential of a narrow view to be taken on such policy issues, 
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and the network wide considerations that should be made: “probably, but it’s really the people 
who travel long distances every day that would be most. And we can’t forget that, on the 
whole, Sydney’s transport is pretty decent: we should also be thinking about the people in 
Wollongong or Newcastle, for instance, who drive long distances all the time.” 
 
4.5 Equity Issues and Socio-Economic Impacts 
Equity issues were identified consistently as being of specific relevance to Sydney, primarily 
on the grounds of existing socio-economic distribution and actual or perceived inequalities, 
and the current provision of public transport services.  
 
Respondent 5 suggested that perceptions were as important as reality in making road pricing 
strategies acceptable: “people living in the west and north west especially are going to think 
that they are being ripped off by any road pricing strategy that is worth implementing, 
probably whether they are or not”. This problem was also touched upon by respondent 2 – 
“the real trick is in identifying the winners and losers, and making sure that winners know that 
they are winners – because some won’t and may even think they’re losers – and listening to 
the losers”. 
 
Equity issues also need not only apply to individuals, nor to stakeholders who may currently 
be disadvantaged, as respondent 7 noted that the freight industry, which is easily organised, 
stands to be comparatively worse off as road freight potentially becomes less competitive with 
rail freight for long-haul movement: “it’s not necessarily one person compared to another, or 
another area compared to another, but between industries as well. There are real issues for the 
freight industry if it becomes significantly cheaper to put more containers on trains up and 
down the east coast.”   
 
4.6 Attribution of Responsibility 
The attribution of responsibility for all private vehicle related externalities, primarily 
congestion, environmental impacts and safety, was not considered to be a significant element 
of road pricing acceptability. The general sentiment among respondents was that 
responsibility was assumed to rest with the government for addressing these issues and that 
little could be expected of individuals to act in the collective interests.  
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One difference of opinion was apparent, as respondent 9 suggested that internal attribution of 
responsibility (that is, acknowledging one’s own contribution the problem) did not necessarily 
equate to altruistic behaviour. When referring to road pricing as a means of asset management 
and maintenance, respondent 9 pointed out that “sure heavy vehicles cause more damage per 
vehicle on the road, but they also move things around so people can have their groceries and 
petrol. Perhaps that’s the price to pay for those benefits”. 
 
4.7 Use of Revenues and Provision of Alternatives 
The use of revenues and provision of alternative transport options are very closely linked, and 
were often discussed in parallel in the interviews. The hypothecation of road pricing revenues 
to other transport initiatives and the provision of alternative transport choices (or lack of in 
certain cases) were largely identified as two of historic and current challenges to the 
implementation of road pricing in Sydney. This was one area where the complexities of the 
policy environment in New South Wales were acutely evident in government respondents 
conversations (perhaps overly so); far less in non-government respondents conversations. 
Nonetheless, all agreed that both issues were significant. 
 
Respondent 4 noted that it is not only the provision of alternative (public) transport that is 
critical, but that that transport precedes any road pricing scheme: “it’s absolutely critical to 
enhance the public transport services before people are made to pay more. It’s not fair to try 
to change behaviour when there aren’t any alternatives to change to. Especially in the areas 
where transport is pretty poor already”. 
 
Respondent 6 noted that the hypothecation of revenues, which was admitted as being of 
critical importance to acceptability, was a significant barrier to the policy process: “well that’s 
the sticking point isn’t it. We’ve been saying for years that we need to make sure every cent 
goes into transport, be it roads, rail or the other modes, but Treasury just don’t wont to do it. 
That’s the problem with operating in such a fiscally oriented and fiscally centralist 
government. Maybe that can change now with Transport NSW and a single transport budget, 
but Treasury still don’t like letting go of the purse strings” 
 
Respondent 3 made an interesting point that brings into question the necessarily political 
toxicity of additional taxes, which road pricing can often be criticised as being: “at some point 
in the late eighties or early nineties, I don’t know you’ll have to look it up, there was this 
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thing called the ‘three by three’ tax – an addition to the fuel excise. It was an extra three cents 
a litre for a set three years, and it was surprisingly popular, as popular as a tax can be, because 
it was specifically for the purpose of road maintenance, which people thought of as being a 
priority issue”. If true, this precedent would also support the notions of ‘problem perception’ 
and ‘attribution of responsibility’ elements of acceptability.  
 
4.8 Levels/Layer of Government  
The levels of government (the complexity of the policy making environment) and the layer of 
government (the tier at which primary responsibility for transport policy decisions rest) was 
the issue that was most divisive among the sample group. While all agreed with the 
proposition that a more complex institutional environment would likely frustrate the policy 
making process, there was variance in opinions of whether current conditions in Sydney and 
New South Wales were tenable for road pricing acceptance and implementation. Similarly, 
there was disagreement within the sample as to the importance as to the layer of government 
primarily responsible for transport decision, and within those who thought it was either 
somewhat or very important, there was disagreement as to which tier of government would be 
most appropriate. 
 
Respondent 6, speaking from a position of leadership within the state government, was blunt 
in his assessment of the impact of the institutional environment on the policy outcomes: “It is 
possible to get the right result under our current governance”. The manner in which this was 
delivered inferred that the true nature of the response was a lack of interest for obstacles that 
perhaps could not be overcome, so did not warrant effort.  
 
Respondent 3 noted that the complex environment that existed within and between states 
increased the complexity of almost all roads policy: “It’s not just the Minister you’ve got to 
convince; it’s the Premier, the stakeholder groups like motoring associations and industry, but 
then when we’re talking about vehicles that can cross borders, we find the need for 
consistency of approaches. So then we have the ATC [Australian Transport Council – a forum 
of state Transport Ministers and the Federal Minister for Infrastructure], COAG [Council of 
Australian Governments – a forum of state Premiers and the Federal Prime Minister] and the 
NTC [the National Transport Commission – a research and policy advisory body that reports 
to the ATC].” 
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Respondent 2 favoured a more local/municipal/metropolitan authority for road pricing 
schemes (presumably urban road pricing schemes): “If you look at London and Amsterdam, 
then yes I think they might have a slightly easier time because they didn’t have as many 
people to please and as many hoops to jump through. I don’t think it’s the most critical issue, 
but yes, if we could start again I think a more Metropolitan system could work.” 
 
Others favoured a more national or federal approach: “we have vehicles that drive from 
Victoria through NSW and up to Queensland. I don’t think we’d like a different system in 
each state – it would quadruple the back office work to get it all together. It’s the same with 
registering vehicles; all the states have slightly different requirements and it’s such an 
administrative burden just to get a mover on the road” (Respondent 9).   
 
4.9 Other Issues to Arise 
The interviews sought to both gauge the significance and relevance to Sydney of the elements 
of road pricing acceptability identified in the literature, and to identify any other issues that 
weren’t prevalent in the literature. While each of the respondents touched upon some issues 
outside of the literature findings, two featured recurrently throughout the interviews.  
 
4.9.1 Timing 
The concept of timing was addressed frequently in the interview process. While the term 
“timing” is quite vague, it could, as result of the interviews, be interpreted as three discrete 
elements: the lead time of road pricing scheme implementation; the time within an electoral 
cycle that it is introduced; and the conditions at the point in history when road pricing is 
pursued.  
 
The lead time of road pricing schemes was noted as being of significance, and potentially 
underestimated or too narrowly considered: “it’s not just about the policy development and 
putting up gantries or whatever it may be, but you’ve also got to consider how long it will 
take to deliver bus services or some other alternative beforehand. It could probably be done in 
parallel, but it needs to be considered” (respondent 4). Further, the dimensions of the policy 
process that may be beyond the interests of economists or theorists need to be considered: “we 
need to have a dialogue with the community, to really make them aware of the benefits. That 
alone could take two years” (respondent 1). 
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Secondly, the lead time of a pricing scheme, once understood, needs to be considered in the 
context of an electoral cycle: “We have four-year fixed terms. It’s not unreasonable to think 
that it will be unpopular to begin with, but if you can get a trial or pilot phase happening for, 
say,  a year, and people see that it’s not too bad and that there are benefits, it may be more 
palatable. If that’s the case, then you would want to be doing the announcing early in the 
electoral cycle to give yourself enough time to make people happier about it” (respondent 5).  
 
Lastly, the specific time in a city’s history was identified as being relevant to the 
implementation of road pricing schemes, and potentially transport policy more broadly: “the 
timing just hasn’t been right … we need to work within and look beyond the political cycle” 
(respondent 1), “let’s face it, we could be looking at a two-term government next year, and 
that might be when governments make the brave decisions” (respondent 5), “there is 
sufficient disenchantment with transport in Sydney” and “it really rides or falls on the 
majority of the next government” (respondent 6). 
 
4.9.2 Communication 
As highlighted in the interview results for “problem perception” and “perceived effectiveness 
of solutions, communication has been a fundamental role to play in the acceptability of any 
policy proposition. For road pricing, it was seen to be particularly important, and a particular 
weakness of the policy debate in NSW so far, as the objectives of the policy may not be clear 
or obvious, the concepts involved are necessarily complex, and the implications for various 
stakeholders are varied: “as someone who is pretty clued up on this stuff, but also a member 
of the public, I can see why people would have reservations about it: with most road safety 
initiatives, for instance, it’s pretty clear what they are trying to achieve, but people hear 
‘pricing’ or ‘tolls’ or ‘charging’ and, without knowing what they’re paying for, are 
immediately sceptical, and understandably so” (respondent 8). 
 
The generalised sentiment to come from the sample group was that the majority of the 
knowledge, technical or otherwise, already exists within various bodies in the policy 
environment, but that the language around the issues involved was inadequate, and that 
communication of ideas was not targeted to audiences information needs: “theorists haven’t 
adequately engaged with elected officials, and vice versa. We need to partner in research so 
that research has a higher degree of ownership” (respondent 1).  
The acceptability of road pricing: An application of a theoretical and analytical framework to the realities 
of decision making in Sydney 
                                                                                                                                                                         Palmer 
 
  page 45 
5 Discussion 
The above research has outlined the key concepts relevant to road pricing, public and political 
acceptability, case studies of world experience in road pricing acceptability, and presented the 
findings from a series of interviews conducted with various subject matter experts in Sydney, 
New South Wales. It is found that road pricing, in a general sense, enjoys widespread support 
from the economic and academic community. The many and varied potential benefits of 
comprehensive road pricing schemes are well documented.  
 
In comparing the apparent importance of various elements of public and political acceptability 
in the literature with the importance ascribed to those same elements by people who may 
collectively be called ‘practitioners’, some anomalies appear. A number of elements are 
generally agreed upon – “perceived effectiveness of solutions”, “use of revenues”, “provision 
of alternatives” and “problem perception” are identified by the literature and the practitioners 
as being of relative importance to the acceptability problem, whereas “attribution of 
responsibility” is similarly agreed to be of relative unimportance. Notably, the literature 
suggests that practitioners need to pay more attention to “mobility related social norms”; an 
element that was largely disregarded among the sample group. The response of the 
practitioners suggests that more research needs to be done on the various issues within the 
concept of “timing”, and that there is considerable divergence of opinion on suitable 
governance arrangement for road pricing and transport decision making.  
 
Road pricing is largely considered in isolation in the literature, but critically needs to be 
viewed in context of broader transport policy: “Congestion charging alone will rarely, if ever, 
be a stand-alone transport policy. It must be part of a balanced package of measures, 
providing adequate alternatives to the use of the car, and ameliorating the adverse effects” 
(Lindsey, 2006, pg. 223). That the problem pricing measures aim to address is largely 
assumed to be only congestion is not surprising, but a fundamental reframing of the problem 
to include a wider range of issues – and therefore benefits - would likely increase the political 
traction of pricing strategies. 
 
5.1 The Issue of Timing 
The nature of timing in the policy setting context, and the specific timing issues relating to 
road pricing implementation, is an under-represented aspect of road pricing’s acceptability 
problem in the literature. Timing-related issues are made explicit in only a few studies, and 
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are inferred as being of relevance to some cases without those cases examining the role it 
plays in any depth. Interview respondents frequently referred to issues around timing, and 
while these issues were not identical, the recurrence signifies that this is key consideration in 
a genuine policy setting context. Broadly, the issues of timing that were raised in interviews 
can be grouped as: pricing scheme implementation lead time; alignment of road pricing policy 
phases with electoral cycles; and the political feasibility of road pricing a given point in 
history. 
 
The development and implementation lead time of road pricing schemes emerged as an issue 
that does not have a consistent understanding within the literature or respondents, and whose 
impact or significance is not properly understood. De Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen (2006, 
pg. 160) focus their comparative case study analysis on “a framework for formulating 
implementation paths for pricing reform”. This provides a useful analysis of task-dependency 
and the welfare benefits or losses that may be expected from any given implementation path. 
The analysis does not, however, provide any reference to time: how long various 
implementation paths may take – or elements within those paths – or should take to not only 
maximise welfare gains, but to maximise public and political acceptability. Also, the analysis 
includes only those elements of the implementation path that a planner may consider: no 
mention is made of community dialogue or education in the early stages of development. 
 
Understanding the impact of policy development and implementation lead times for road 
pricing strategies is not apparently recognised as an important issue in the literature, however 
two cases may provide insight into how implementation lead times are significant. In London, 
the elapsed time between the policy being used as a key platform for an election campaign, 
and the scheme being implemented was just over three years; a relatively short lead time 
(Lindsey, 2006). Conversely, the decade long public and political debate has been noted as 
one of the main factors that led to the erosion of public support in Edinburgh (Gaunt, Rye and 
Allen, 2007). While rushing implementation would not be advised as due diligence is 
required, both case studies have noted the role that implementation lead time played in their 
relative success, with the more expedient implementation being more successful. Lindsey 
(2006, pg. 223) articulates: 
 
“Whilst it can be argued that a radical policy, such as congestion 
charging, should be developed slowly, allowing time to build support, 
there is strong evidence which suggests that an initial commitment to 
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controversial policies can be eroded over time, in the face of 
procedural and funding difficulties, technical issues, political change 
and  well orchestrated opposition. Thus speedy action can ensure 
delivery that might fail with a more relaxed approach.” 
 
What may be considered a reasonable timeframe for road pricing policy development and 
scheme implementation – reasonable in that it achieves economic, technical and political 
feasibility – is also a mystery. De Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen (2006) come closest to 
defining a beneficial implementation path, but again no time parameters are ascribed to this. 
Interview respondents had varying interpretations of what phases may be included in these 
development and implementation times, and the magnitude of these timeframes: respondent 6 
suggested that Sydney could feasibly establish a scheme “in two and a half years”, yet 
respondent 1 noted that “we need to have a dialogue with the community, to really make them 
aware of the benefits. That alone could take two years”. The degree of overlap between the 
‘dialogue’ and technical implementation is not clear, however respondent 4 noted that phases 
need not necessarily be consecutive, as alternative transport delivery and scheme 
implementation “could probably be done in parallel”.   
 
The second element of timing is the alignment of road pricing policy phases with electoral 
cycles. This notion is not directly addressed in the literature. Interview respondent 5 noted 
that: “We have four-year fixed terms. It’s not unreasonable to think that it will be unpopular 
to begin with, but if you can get a trial or pilot phase happening for, say,  a year, and people 
see that it’s not too bad and that there are benefits, it may be more palatable. If that’s the case, 
then you would want to be doing the announcing early in the electoral cycle to give yourself 
enough time to make people happier about it”. Interview respondent 1 also noted that, for 
complex reform such as road pricing within a wider transport agenda, the government (that is, 
the bureaucracy, not the elected party) must work “within and between political cycles”. 
 
Although not addressed specifically in the literature, two case studies may support the 
sentiment of the respondents. In London, congestion charging was part of Mayoral candidate 
Ken Livingstone’s campaign platform. Rather than being something shied away from, road 
pricing was presented as “a key element of his 2000 manifesto, and to pursue it as soon as he 
took up office, building the team to help him secure a policy that was to become a major 
accomplishment of his first term of office” (Lindsey, 2006, pg. 221). Most importantly, the 
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policy development and scheme implementation could commence at the commencement of 
the electoral cycle. 
 
In contrast, the New York pricing proposal was instigated as part of Mayor Bloomberg’s 
Comprehensive Sustainability Plan, which was launched at the midway point of the New 
York City electoral cycle (2007-8 in an electoral cycle that ran 2006-10), partly as a result of 
the impetus of the availability of federal funding (Schaller, 2010). This potentially sub-
optimal timing meant that when city elections were to be held next, the likelihood of a 
functioning scheme, or even trial, was low. Similarly, the funding opportunity presented by 
the US Department of Transportation was contingent on State Legislature approving the 
policy by April 2008. By providing such artificial time constraints, road pricing planning was 
necessarily rushed, and may have led to the ongoing disagreement between the City of New 
York, the Metropolitan Transport Authority, the State Legislature, and particularly the 
boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, which was the scheme’s ultimate demise. 
 
The limited evidence is insufficient to state whether commencing a road pricing proposal at 
the beginning of an electoral cycle is necessarily beneficial for the overall acceptability. 
Interview respondents and two contrasting case studies provide some evidence (although in 
both cases many more factors must be considered in their respective successes and failures) 
that this may be the case. Most importantly, it should be noted that alignment with electoral 
cycles is an issue repeatedly raised by practitioners, but is lacking scrutiny in the literature, 
and needs to be explored with a greater understanding of implementation lead times.   
 
In a very context specific sense, some of the logic presented above combined with the 
responses provided in interviews indicates that road pricing in Sydney, with regards to timing, 
may be most politically acceptable, and feasible, in the near future. New South Wales is due 
for a State election in March 2011. Immediately, and regardless of who may gain power, this 
represents an opportunity as the beginning of a new electoral cycle. Secondly, two interview 
responses stand out that surmise the opportunity of the next government: “there is sufficient 
disenchantment with transport in Sydney [to make road pricing reform possible]” (respondent 
6) and “there is an appetite for real reform” (respondent 5).  
 
New South Wales has been governed by the same political party since 1995. While 
acknowledging the leading edge technological advancements of Singapore in implementing 
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electronic road pricing in 1998, the 2011 election may introduce the first new government in 
New South Wales since broad-based and/or differentiated road pricing (of some description) 
has become technologically feasible and affordable. Moreover, there is wide speculation in 
public forums and mainstream media that a change of government is likely, with a potentially 
large margin: “let’s face it, we could be looking at a two-term government next year” 
(respondent 5). The implications of this possibility on transport reform, including road 
pricing, should not be ignored: the ability for brave policy decisions “rides or falls on the 
majority of the next government” (respondent 6) and “we have the bullets, they just need to 
fire them” (respondent 2). This is echoed by Lindsey (2006, pg. 222), who suggests that in 
road pricing reform “there is a need for political and policy stability”. 
 
5.2 The Levels and Layer of Government 
A passing observation of the ‘success’ cases such as London, Singapore and Oslo was that 
these cities enjoyed relatively simple institutional environments: each has a single authority at 
least responsible for all metropolitan transport planning and delivery, and those authorities 
were the layer of government at the most local level (i.e. not state/county/province or national 
layers of government). A simple two-part hypothesis to draw could be that (a) the fewer levels 
of government in a decision making setting (or the less complex the institutional 
environment), the more likely complex policy proposals are to be politically successful, and 
(b) the lower the tier of government responsible for transport planning decisions, the more 
likely road pricing schemes will be implemented.  
 
This first hypothesis is so intuitive it almost does not warrant examination. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that this notion does receive support from the road pricing acceptability 
literature, whose collective sentiment is that   
 “the existence of different political levels... may become an important obstacle for congestion 
pricing implementation” (Albalate and Bel, 2009, pg. 965). Within particular case studies, 
“the importance of a single implementing agency” (Rye, Gaunt and Ison, 2008, pg. 660) that 
“has responsibility for the major road network, traffic (signal) control, and buses, and is also 
the charging authority” (Lindsey, 2006, pg. 225) has also been identified frequently. 
Importantly, this does not suggest that a single authority or simple institutional environment is 
either necessary or sufficient for successful road pricing implementation (unless, of course, 
Singapore’s government style is considered), but that with simplicity comes greater likelihood 
of acceptance. 
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The second hypothesis – that the lower the tier of government responsible for transport 
planning decisions the more likely road pricing schemes will be implemented – is neither 
significantly or directly supported nor opposed in the literature. While it this happens to be the 
case in the success cases studies, the limited size of this sample and the wide range of factors 
that influence political acceptability mean that this can only be considered a coincidence. 
Also, as the cases examined all happen to be relatively small and dense countries, such that 
administering road pricing schemes at a national level could be an entirely different 
experience to doing so in a geographically vast country. Lessons from the cases relating to 
this issue may not be transferable.  
 
Interview respondents, however, demonstrate a considerable amount of divergence in opinion 
on what may be the most suitable layer or tier of government to drive the policy process and 
administer a road pricing scheme. Within the interview respondents, there was various 
support for each of the three broad tiers of Australian government: Federal, State and 
Local/Metropolitan. In support of State government, respondent 6 noted that “there are over 
60 local councils in Sydney; it’s like trying herd cats ... it’s possible to get the right result 
under our current governance”, implying that if administered at the local or metropolitan level 
(such as the City of Sydney), Sydney may encounter similar locality based politicking such as 
that which frustrated the New York proposal.  
 
Others thought that by focussing the scheme into a narrower geographic area, and accordingly 
a more local authority, the potential range of conflicts would be reduced: “If it’s done at a 
state level, then you really open yourself up to a lot of communities. There’s always that city-
country cross subsidy issue that people get worked up over, so maybe more local would be 
better. Maybe not like City of Sydney, but more like the bigger metropolitan council model 
like Brisbane.” (respondent 1). Also, “while the economic ideal is to charge everyone for all 
their road use, in effect you’re going to get the biggest gains and the greatest cost efficiency 
by focussing on just the metropolitan areas” (respondent 8). 
 
Support for Federal tier of government developing and implementing a road pricing scheme 
came from unsurprising perspectives: the freight sector has an interest in national consistency 
due to cross-border operations. This research finds that the tier of government responsible for 
transport decision making has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. While success 
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cases demonstrate that lower tiers of government have been successful, these instances do 
nothing to show that other tiers of government could not also be successful. Similarly, 
‘failure’ cases, particularly Manchester, can show that the lowest tier of government does not 
guarantee success either. Just as optimal pricing schemes may vary contextually based on 
geographic spread, so too may optimal governance structures.   
 
5.3 The Knowledge Mismatch and Communication 
While not a focal point of this research, the issue of communication has emerged frequently 
throughout case analysis and interviews. There is a clear disjoint between what is known by 
subject matter experts (both practitioners and economists), political decision makers, and the 
public (or perhaps ‘road use consumers’ if including industry such as freight movers) 
respectively regarding concepts relevant to road pricing. More subtly, there may be a 
misperception regarding what each of these groups wants, expects or needs to know to make 
road pricing acceptable to them.  Miller and Meyer (2001, pg. 60) confirm this problem, 
stating “one of the first difficulties in relating decision making to transportation planning is ... 
a wide variety of participants often requiring different forms of information support, including 
... the characteristics, capabilities and ‘needs’ of the decision makers”.  
 
As a case in point, communication, particularly understanding the information requirements 
of the public, was a major contributor to the failure of the Edinburgh proposal - “It was clear 
that it [the pricing scheme] was too complicated to be understood, never mind supported, by a 
majority of the public” (Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2010, pg. 100) - but was a major contributor to 
the success of the London proposal: “Ensuring that a very high proportion of those who drive 
to London were aware of the scheme and how it would affect them was crucial to its smooth 
launch” (Lindsey, 2006, pg. 228). Nonetheless, a failure to communicate necessarily complex 
concepts in an easily digestible manner is understandable, as “marginal cost pricing is hard (or 
impossible) to explain to the public” (Viegas, 2001, pg. 291). 
 
5.4 An Evaluation of Road Pricing Acceptability in Sydney 
Based on the acceptability literature and the interviews conducted, some assessments can be 
made of factors that may promote or frustrate the acceptability of future road pricing schemes 
in Sydney. This account is not exhaustive, but reflects those issues which have been most 
resonant throughout the research.  
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5.4.1 Reasons for Optimism 
While more comprehensive road pricing of some form has been largely avoided by political 
decision makers in New South Wales for some time, there are reasons for optimism for road 
pricing proponents in Sydney.  
 
Firstly, the existence and expansion of toll roads increases public awareness of the concept of 
paying for road use, and provides an opportunity to implement pricing with a greater degree 
of differentiation on new infrastructure. Increasing the awareness of the concept alone is an 
important step in achieving acceptance - “tolls, if they make people aware of the virtues of 
road pricing, could eventually turn out to be a useful “Trojan Horse” for broader based 
congestion taxes” (Parry, 2002, pg. 356) – and in this sense Sydney has an advantage over 
cities that do not currently charge for any road use whatsoever. The pending expansion of the 
M2 motorway, and the duplication of the M4 motorway (both elements of the existing Sydney 
Orbital Network) provide opportunities to introduce differentiated pricing incrementally, as 
“planners are usually reluctant to charge for a good that has always been free and is conserved 
to be a right” (Albalate and Bel, 2009, pg. 964), but this aversion may be lessened on new 
infrastructure.  
 
Secondly, decision making for disparate transport modes in Sydney, including planning and 
delivery, has been combined into a single entity. As of July 2009, the major strategic planning 
and budgetary processes of the various transport agencies that existed within New South 
Wales - most notably RailCorp (metropolitan rail), the Roads and Traffic Authority (roads 
and associated operations), State Transit Authority (buses), Sydney Ferries, and a variety of 
smaller planning and construction bodies – were subsumed into a single entity called 
Transport NSW. As discussed above, the presence of a single authority that “has 
responsibility for the major road network, traffic (signal) control, and buses, and is also the 
charging authority” (Lindsey, 2006, pg. 225), and in the case of Sydney heavy rail as well, is 
advantageous to road pricing implementation. This is largely due to the well-documented 
need for the hypothecation of road pricing revenues to transport, but not exclusively roads, 
investment to support acceptability. At face value Transport NSW presents the opportunity for 
the movement of these funds between modes to facilitate effective hypothecation.  
 
Thirdly, as noted above, New South Wales is due for a state election in early 2011. While 
conclusions should not be jumped to, many indicators suggest a change of government is 
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likely, and a large margin is possible. Not only does this present Sydney with the beginning of 
a new electoral cycle, which may be an opportune time to launch a road pricing proposal, but 
it may provide New South Wales with the stability in government (two terms has been 
speculated) that promotes brave policy decisions. In essence, whereas “the timing has just not 
been right” (respondent 1) in many of the years since electronic and sophisticated pricing 
became technically feasible, the time may be right in the near future. 
 
Lastly, the notion of a discretionary tax (of which road pricing schemes is one) is not new to 
New South Wales motorists or the Australian population more generally. Examples cited in 
the interviews are the Goods and Services Tax (GST) established nationally in 2000 and the 
“3x3” tax established in New South Wales in 1989. The former received fierce opposition, but 
was implemented with enough time to at least partially disprove the strongest critics, and the 
government of the day was re-elected (albeit with a reduced majority, however this directly 
relates to the point above regarding the margin of the next government). The latter was levied 
on fuel sold in New South Wales at 3 cents per litre for an intial set three year period, with all 
revenues going “towards road improvements and road safety” (NSW Government, 2001, pg. 
2). It was – anecdotally – relatively popular due to the specific “earmarking” (respondent 3), 
or hypothecation, of the funds towards nominated transport projects. These taxes are 
significant in that they both represent the relatively successful attempts to implement a pricing 
scheme – one for specifically for transport and the other not – that mirror some of the 
concepts relevant to road pricing. This precedent, and therefore (at least) partial awareness, 
may be beneficial in educating motorists of the “current inequity” of existing means of paying 
for road use, and the relative equity associated with broad-based road pricing strategies 
(Schweitzer and Taylor, 2008, pg. 810). 
 
5.4.2 Ongoing Frustrations 
None of this is to say that road pricing implementation in Sydney is assured. Certainly the 
communication issue will be problematic in any jurisdiction that attempts road pricing. The 
following are factors that may frustrate the implementation of road pricing in Sydney. 
 
Firstly, while the combination of disparate transport bodies within a single tier of government 
into a single entity is seen as a positive step, it does not change the complexity of governance 
arrangements across tiers of government. Transport NSW, despite incorporating all modes 
and promoting network and administrative integration, still operates in an environment that 
The Acceptability of Road Pricing: An application of a theoretical and analytical framework to the realities 
of decision making in Sydney 
Palmer____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
includes a major metropolitan council (the City of Sydney) and many local municipalities. 
This will continue to be an obstacle for effective policy implementation. Similarly, the ideals 
of national consistency between states and territories, and various national level authorities 
guiding major infrastructure development will frustrate the implementation of road pricing 
policy.  
 
Secondly, an interesting point raised through the interview process is that of a “fiscally 
centralist style of government” (respondent 6). Such a style of government is not in the nature 
of any single political party, but embedded in the institutions of government: both the 
bureaucratic bodies and the tradition ways of operating. As such, this style is government, or 
more correctly, this style of governing, is likely to transcend political parties and single 
elections. The implications of a fiscally centralist government is that revenues from road 
pricing schemes cannot be easily hypothecated for transport initiatives, as a central monetary 
body – in this case NSW Treasury – retains control over the allocation of all state funds and 
has right of approval over major expenditure. As noted repeatedly above, the hypothecation of 
road pricing revenues is considered fundamental to acceptability of any given scheme. If, as 
in NSW, a central monetary body is unwilling (or at least not inclined) to hypothecate these 
funds in advance, then the overall acceptability of the scheme itself is threatened. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Limitations of Research 
 
6.1.1 Sample Size 
The empirical component of this research was based on the thoughts and opinions (albeit 
reasonably well-informed thoughts and opinions) of nine individuals (excluding the author). It 
is feasible that had a larger, different or more diverse sample been consulted the results of the 
research may have been different.  
 
This is not to say that the outcomes of the research are necessarily incorrect or invalid. A 
body of literature exists that is based on similar research methods with comparable sample 
sizes (see Gaunt, Rye and Ison, 2008, for a particularly good example). The important 
qualification is that the research should not be considered definitive: the research aims to 
contribute to the broad literature on this topic, to complement it, and to articulate issues that 
are apparently under-represented in the literature in light of their perceived importance or 
significance in the decision making environment. 
 
6.1.2 Span of Issues Captured 
A purpose of this research was to capture a number of issues that that may be under-
represented or completely neglected in the literature. It was not to capture all possible issues 
that could be described as such. For the purposes of elaborating on, and in doing so providing 
substantial analysis of, the few issues that appeared most pertinent, not all issues that could be 
identified were, and all that were identified received detailed analysis. 
 
Focussing on certain issues at the expense of others threatens the ability of future research to 
replicate the results: often considered a key quality of robust research (Moravcsik, 2010). As 
with the limitation outlined in Section 5.1.1, this is overcome by considering the research to 
be read in parallel to other work: as being contributory to the literature, not definitive. Further, 
this research has followed the two principles of replicable qualitative research – rigor and 
transparency - set out by Moravcsik (2010, pp. 31-32) which are: “Any critical and contested 
substantive empirical point in a scholarly case study should be backed by a precise and 
annotated citation to one or more presumptively primary sources” and “Citations must contain 
a reproduction or transcript of some part of the source”, with the perceived benefits being 
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“Higher-Quality Scholarship”, “Wider Criticism”, “Richer Secondary and Meta-Analysis” 
and “More Intensive Interdisciplinary Engagement”. 
 
6.2 Areas for Further Research 
Identifying areas for further research was a core objective of this project. While there are 
numerous issues to have arisen from the literature review, case studies and interview process, 
three stand out as being considerable pieces of work that represent a significant gap or under-
representation in the literature. 
 
6.2.1 The Relationship Between Road Pricing Scheme Lead Times, Electoral Cycles and 
Political Feasibility. 
The issues of timing in regards to scheme implementation and political feasibility arose 
consistently in interview, but were only mention summarily in the literature. A body of work 
exists on the merits (or not) of phased implementation of road pricing schemes, however even 
these do little to identify the temporal pressures, even in an order of magnitude, that exist 
between implementation considerations and political ones. A broad assessment of the 
literature has shown that the time from policy development and a decision to proceed to 
established implementation is often longer than may initially be anticipated or planned for. 
Also, political considerations such a consultation process with the community, which have the 
potential to add considerable time to the overall process, may be overlooked.  
 
Problematically, the cases studies imply that a shorter policy debate and implementation lead 
time increase the likelihood of a road pricing scheme being accepted by the public. In essence, 
it would appear that implementation factors pressure the process to take more time, whereas 
political factors pressure the process to take less. What parameters or range that a successful 
approach may take in a time scale – some period of time that satisfies both pressures – is a 
core piece of work to be undertaken. 
 
6.2.2 The Feasibility of Hypothecation in Fiscally-Centralist Government 
Hypothecation of road pricing generated revenues into transport related projects and 
initiatives has been seen to be crucial in the public acceptability of road pricing schemes. It 
has been a feature of successful cases, and a stipulation or condition of opposing parties in 
unsuccessful schemes.   
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New South Wales, and Australian states more generally, operate in a form of government that 
has been labelled throughout the course of this research as fiscally centralist, implying that the 
vast majority of government revenues and expenditure are controlled by a central agency 
(Treasury). This tradition of government has transcended political parties and is unlikely to 
change dramatically in the near future. While New South Wales has been the specific subject 
of this research, this style of governance is not uncommon throughout the world. 
 
Fiscal centralism is at odds with hypothecation. This is not to say that the two concepts are 
incompatible, but that the presence of the former does somewhat impede the latter. 
Hypothecation, such as of road pricing revenues, is more easily attainable in modes of 
government and governance where authorities, be they specific to geography (i.e. Greater 
London Authority) or to policy areas (i.e. Department for Transport) have greater autonomy 
over their own revenue and expenditure. 
 
This represents an interesting opportunity for further research. The conditions under which 
hypothecation is attainable in a fiscally centralist environment require clarification. The 
implication of this knowledge would also go beyond road pricing acceptability, as the concept 
of hypothecation is not limited to transport policy, but to almost any government function that 
generates revenues.  
 
6.2.3 Perceptions of Congestion Experience and Expectations in Sydney and Surrounds  
An interesting insight to come from the interview process was that of the difference between 
the perceptions and realities of congestion in Sydney. Congestion in Sydney is predominantly 
measured, both by the roads authority and the popular media, along several key corridors. 
While these corridors do carry vast volumes of traffic, they do not come close representing 
the total movements of all people in vehicles in Sydney. Thus these measures may 
dramatically over- or under-state the severity of congestion in Sydney. Taylor (2001, pg. 10) 
notes that equating “congestion in cities” with “freeway congestion” does a disservice to the 
overall road pricing debate as it skews measurements of actual congestion, and does not fully 
appreciate the value of all links in a trip chain.   
 
Further, studies that quantify congestion costs in dollar terms (or any other measure for that 
matter) give an implicit message that successful congestion abatement requires this measure 
to be zero. This may not be the case. As noted by one respondent: “people expect and are 
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happy to accept a certain level of congestion”. This means that trying to eliminate congestion 
altogether, as well as being technically improbable, may also be politically inappropriate also. 
Taylor (2001, pg. 10) defends the place of road congestion, suggesting that “congestion is an 
unfortunate consequence of prosperity and a drag on otherwise high levels of accessibility, 
not a cause of economic decline or urban decay”. In essence, congestion, as long as it is not in 
debilitating magnitudes, is an inevitable product of economic vibrancy, and attempting to 
eliminate altogether rather than just reduce it, may be a sub-optimal strategy. 
 
In a Sydney context, there is limited evidence of the congestion people actually experience, 
the level of congestion they perceive to experience, and the level of congestion that they 
expect (and accept) to experience. These three pieces of information will be critical to 
informing road pricing and, more broadly, traffic management more broadly, policy. 
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6.3 Concluding Remarks 
Road pricing is, and will likely continue to be, an economically sound but politically fraught 
policy proposal. Despite supporting arguments coming from a wide variety of interest groups 
and policy areas, there remain issues that frustrate the public and political acceptability of 
road pricing. This paper has examined the concepts at the core of road pricing, outlined some 
cases studies of implementation failure of road pricing schemes, explored the various 
elements of notions of acceptability from the literature, presented the findings of a series of 
interviews with subject matter experts in NSW, and discussed how these elements may 
interact specifically within the context of Sydney.  
 
The ability of road pricing techniques and approaches to ameliorate excessive congestion in 
urban areas is widely acknowledged. The environmental benefits of congestion reduction, as 
well as the ability of pricing measures to alter motorists behaviour to favour more 
environmentally choices, has been shown to be an important argument to increase public 
acceptability. A key lesson is that, no matter what primary objectives are for implementing a 
given scheme, emphasising environmental benefits above others is likely to improve 
acceptability. The use of road pricing for asset management purposes is both one of the 
original drivers of road pricing theory, and an area which holds great potential for 
communicating the benefits of pricing techniques for various stakeholders, as asset 
management concepts may act as a conduit between the abstract and the tangible or 
observable.  
 
Public and political acceptability are complex concepts that are often used interchangeably in 
the literature, but which represent discrete ideas. This paper has used public acceptability as a 
sub-set of political acceptability, along with costs, technical feasibility and other political 
impacts. The elements that comprise public acceptability vary in the degree to which they 
influence the overall acceptability of a particular proposition. Most interestingly, the notion of 
socio-economic impacts being a significant factor in the acceptability problem receives 
limited support from empirical studies. Conversely, mobility related social norms have been 
consistently cited as having great influence over the acceptability of a proposal.  
 
The collective sentiment of the interview group revealed some notable points for the 
discussion. Elements of the road pricing acceptability problem were generally agreed upon, 
however the relative importance placed on each varies considerably with the literature on the 
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issue of social norms. The respondent group consistently noted specific issues around ‘timing’ 
as being absent from the literature. While this research does not claim to ascribe responsibility 
for these gaps, it does at a minimum show that economists and theorists may need to more 
closely examine the influence of timing on road pricing schemes, and that ‘practitioners’ may 
need to more closely consider the effect of mobility related social norms on road pricing 
acceptability. There was considerable disagreement within the respondent group as to which 
layer of government being responsible for primary decision making for transport would be 
most conducive to successful road pricing implementation in Sydney.  
 
The prospects for the implementation of broader road pricing in Sydney are decent. Sydney 
has a population who are not foreign to the concepts of paying for road use on some corridors, 
and is embarking on infrastructure expansion that may provide opportunities to more widely 
apply differentiated pricing. In a political acceptability sense, Sydney is approaching the end 
of a political cycle, and therefore the beginning of a new one. As suggested throughout the 
later part of the paper, a new electoral cycle may be an opportune time to commence a road 
pricing initiative. Further, various features of Sydney’s recent political history have suggested 
that Sydney is currently well placed in its own history to drive road pricing, and that the next 
government may be well placed to make brave policy decisions. Road pricing in Sydney will 
not, however, be without its obstacles. The role and nature of the institution of a powerful 
centralised Treasury may frustrate the hypothecation of funds that is deemed to be an integral 
part of pricing acceptability. Sydney, and the NSW government, whilst having consolidated 
the governmental transport functions, still operates within a complex set of local, state and 
national institutions; institutions that are beyond the power of any one state to change. 
Complexity of the institutional environment has been shown to increase the difficulty of 
implement potentially divisive policy proposals such as road pricing. On the whole, the 
prospects of implementation of some form of reasonably sophisticated model of road pricing 
in Sydney are not great (as they would arguably not be ‘great’ in any city), but they are as 
positive as could be hoped for at any time in the road pricing debate. The eventuality relies on 
understanding the information needs of theorists, economists, political decision makers and 
the public, and those needs being met.  
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Appendix 1: Interviewee Biographies 
 
Respondent 1 – A senior executive in the NSW government agency responsible for the 
provision of integrated transport services and infrastructure in NSW, in the section 
responsible for community engagement and policy development. Previous relevant position 
included being Chief of Staff within the Office of the [former] Minister for Transport.  
 
Respondent 2 – A senior manager in the NSW government agency responsible for the 
planning and delivery of road infrastructure, road safety, registration and licensing, and 
associated services. Originally from a law background, respondent 2 has led the agency’s 
efforts on road pricing within a broader suite of road use strategies for over ten years. 
 
Respondent 3 – The head of the peak body of Australian Road agencies. This position 
oversees efforts of policy standardisation or integration between states, the commissioning of 
research on behalf of all jurisdictions, and is responsible for reporting to international 
committees on various aspects of roads administration.  
 
Respondent 4 – An academic at one of Australia’s leading transport and logistics schools, 
specialising in integrated transport planning and land use and environmental evaluation. Has 
also previously worked within NSW state government in environmental, public transport and 
planning departments.  
 
Respondent 5 - A senior manager in the NSW government agency responsible for the 
provision of integrated transport services and infrastructure in NSW, in the section 
responsible for overall business strategy and performance measurement. Previous experience 
has been in the NSW roads agency, and in various other NSW state government departments. 
Specialises in policy strategy.  
 
Respondent 6 – A senior executive in the NSW government agency responsible for the 
provision of integrated transport services and infrastructure in NSW, with general oversight of 
the strategy, policy and operations of the agency, and interfacing with the Minister for Roads. 
Originally from a civil engineering background, respondent 6 has previously lead the division 
of the NSW roads agency that manages network operations, and considers road pricing to be a 
key interest.   
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Respondent 7 – A senior manager at the national body responsible for regulating heavy 
vehicles and aspects of road freight, and ensuring consistency between Australian 
jurisdictions. Leads the policy development division of the national body. Has previously 
managed freight regulation, including pilot schemes heavy vehicle pricing, in NSW and 
Victoria.  
 
Respondent 8 – A senior transport economist at a leading global professional services, 
management and financial consultancy firm. Advises both public and private sector 
organisations on transport and logistics related strategy, and undertakes commissioned 
transport research. Areas of particular interest include sustainability in transport and supply 
chain optimisation.  
 
Respondent 9 – A senior manager of a leading Australian logistics company that makes 
extensive use of the road network for freight purposes and has been involved in pilot program 
for intelligent access schemes in NSW. Leads the strategy, business development and 
government relations division of this company. Originally from a civil engineering and 
infrastructure background.  
 
A number of further ‘informal’ conversations were had with several academics from within 
the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (Sydney University); from within transport 
related bodies in NSW state government; and with officers from most other Australian states 
and the relevant Federal department at a conference attended by the author in September 2010 
in Adelaide, South Australia. While greatly insightful and informative, many of these 
conversations occurred without prior preparation, and as such were not documented in the 
same manner as the semi-structured interviews.  
 
